مجموعة ٦/ ١٩ "الجزيرة العربية: (المملكة العربية السعودية) التقرير السنوي لمملكة الحجاز ونجد." [و‎‎٥‎٢] (٥٤٠/١٠٤)

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26. In the interview at the Foreign Office on the 17th July, the Saudi
Charge d’Affaires had said that opinion on the subject of Palestine was strong
not only in Palestine and other Arab countries, but also in Saudi Arabia. What
public opinion in Saudi Arabia thinks on this or any other subject, and what
effect it has on Ibn Sand, is a difficult question to resolve. There is no free press;
the strong hand of Ibn Saud extends to other things than the maintenance of law
and order; and few foreigners are able to mix with any Saudi subjects except
those in Jedda, where Arab blood is thin with the dilution of centuries and
interest is concentrated on the financial side of the pilgrimage rather than on
Arab politics. Moreover, since Ibn Saud smashed the Ikhwan in 1929, it is not
easy to think of him as afraid of mere talk. Consequently, when it was reported
that public opinion was protesting against the partition proposal, a good deal
of scepticism was aroused. Demonstrations which occurred in Jedda were not
impressive, and there was some suspicion that demonstrations in other places,
followed by telegrams to the King protesting against the policy of His Majesty’s
Government in Palestine, were got up in answer to suggestions from the King
himself. Demonstrations in autocratic countries are naturally liable to suspicion,
but on the other hand it would not be surprising if those parts of Saudi Arabia
which are not entirely wrapped up in the pilgrimage should share the sentiments
of Arabs elsewhere and should show these feelings when assured that they will
not get into trouble for it. Perhaps the most difficult question was to decide
to what extent Ibn Saud was telling the truth when he professed to be embarrassed
by pressure from the Wahabis and ulema of Neid. As early as the 20th July.
Ibn Saud said that the Wahabis of Nejd were raising the strongest objections on
religious grounds to acquiescence in the establishment of a Jewish State, and in
September Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, on his return to London from seeing Ibn Saud
at Riyadh, handed to the Foreign Office copies of a letter from ulema of Nejd to
the King and of his reply. The ulema had, they said, been invited by people
in Nejd and the Hejaz and in foreign countries to ^ive a fetva (religious ruling)
on the question of “ giving to the Jews a land whicn belongs to the Moslems and
establishing a Jewish State in Palestine.” They quoted from the Koran and the
Traditions of the Prophet to prove that the Jews are the most violent enemies of
Islam, and that their attempt to establish a Jewish State was foreseen. To
declare a jehad (holy war) was a religious duty and they proposed to raise the
flag of jehad, and they had no doubt that Ibn Saud would agree with them.
They had heard from trustworthy Moslems that the Jews intended to take Medina,
Kheiber and Teima as soon as they were strong enough, but with God’s help this
design would be frustrated. In his reply Ibn Saud expressed agreement with
the ulema on the question of religious principle and his intention to obey the
precepts of his faith at whatever cost to his person and his throne. He had.
however, thought it best to make representations to His Majesty’s Government
through the diplomatic channels. His friendship with Great Britain was not due
to racial or religious ties, obviously, nor to hope of personal gain, but to his
belief that there was less to fear from Great Britain than from any other of the
great Powers. He therefore begged them to be patient while negotiations were
proceeding between His Majesty’s Government and himself and other Arab rulers.
If the negotiations succeeded, then God be praised ! If not, then his excuse
would be clear to the British Government, as he could not prevent anyone who
wished from stating his religious convictions.
27. Accompanying the copies of this correspondence was a memorandum
from Ibn Saud giving his views on the situation. While assuring His Majesty’s
Government as always of his desire for their friendship he described the Palestine
question as a matter of life and death and begged His Majesty’s Government
to change their decision about partition. He suggested that they had already
fulfilled their promise to the Jews, and described the so-called exchange of
populations as an “ unprecedented clearing-out ” of the Arabs from the Jewish
zone. He suggested as the basis of a final settlement:—
(1) The establishment of a constitutional Government in Palestine in which
the present population w^ould be represented proportionally, with
guarantees for minorities, the Holy Places, the maintenance of justice
and the interests of Great Britain.
[17650] c* 3