مجموعة ٦/ ١٩ "الجزيرة العربية: (المملكة العربية السعودية) التقرير السنوي لمملكة الحجاز ونجد." [و‎‎٩‎٢] (٥٤٠/١٨٤)

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view. A few days later Sir Andrew Ryan, acting on instructions from the
Foreign Office, informed him of the attitude of His Majesty’s Government in
regard to the Italian decree. The copy handed in by the Italian Ambassador
had been accepted under all reserve, and it had been decided to return no further
reply to the Italian Government in the matter. Yusuf Yasin said that M. Persico
had now notified the Italian Government’s decision to the Saudi Government in
writing, and that he had since seen M. Persico and had reasserted the views of
the Saudi Government regarding the effects of their neutrality, and that it had
been decided to return no further answer. Would such silence, he enquired,
commit his Government in any way ? Sir Andrew Ryan said that if the Saudi
Government had defined their position clearly after receipt of the written
communication no further reply was necessary. The attitude of the Saudi
Government seemed to him, he added, analogous to that of His Majesty’s Govern
ment, subject to the difference that it was based on neutrality, whereas that of
His Majesty’s Government rested on other principles. In reporting this to the
Foreign Office, Sir Andrew Ryan added that, while he naturally did not know
exactly what Yusuf Yasin had said to the Italian Charge d’Affaires, he was
satisfied that the Saudi Government did not intend to commit themselves
prematurely to recognition of the Italian annexation.
91. There is no doubt that Ibn Saud was seriously disturbed by the outcome
of the Italian attack on Ethiopia. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin spoke of these misgivings
to Sir Andrew Ryan in May, especially in regard to a possible attack on the
Yemen, and in October, when making to Sir Reader Bullard, on instructions from
Ibn Saud, a summary of the King’s views on the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia,
he again referred to the King’s uneasiness. On both occasions replies of a
generally reassuring nature were given. Mr. Philby, who was at Ashaira during
M. Persico’s visit, brought back a similar account of the perturbation in the
King’s mind. The implications of his language seemed to be these. Reliance
on Great Britain was the corner-stone of Ibn Saud’s policy. Great Britain had
failed to oppose a successful resistance to Italy in the case of Abyssinia, and had,
in fact, let that country down. How, then, could the King have confidence in
the will or the ability of His Majestv’s Government to resist Italian ambitions
in the Red Sea ? Commenting on the statements of Mr. Philby, Sir Andrew Ryan
wrote as follows :—
“ The King watches, as best he can, events in Europe, but he has little
true comprehension of them, much less of such concepts as that of collective
security or any sort of security upheld by moral force. He has little real
interest in Abyssinia, and has seen in the recent conflict, not so much a war
between Italy and an African Power, as a struggle between Italy and Great
Britain. He sees in the result a sweeping victory for Italian force in this
struggle. Obsessed, as he has been for years, with the fear of Italian
ambitions in the Red Sea, he fears that that force may in the future be turned
against the Arabian Peninsula. As a Moslem ruler still engaged in
consolidating his position in Arabia and jealous of his hardly-won indepen
dence, he has no genuine love for Great Britain, a Power which blocks his
way in various directions, e.g., in the east and south of the peninsula, but he
has much less to fear from British policy on this side of it than he thinks he
has to fear from that of Italy. The only fortunate feature of this is that
Ibn Saud probably believes that it was not so much the ability as the will
to save Abyssinia that was wanting in the attitude of His Majesty’s Govern
ment as conceived by his simple mind. He probably still believes that a
breach with them would be fatal to him, and hopes against hope that they
would see him through in the event of a breach between him and any other
European Power. He dare not go against Great Britain. He dare not
ofiend Italy. ‘ Neutrality ’ is more than ever his slogan, because, as I have
said, he has seen not a war in Africa, but a conflict, not yet ended, between
Great Britain and Italy. He does not yet know what its effects in Arabia
may be, and it is with reference to this struggle that he clings to the slogan.”
92. There is good reason to believe that in spite of Italian blandishments
and presents Ibn Saud behaved towards them with as much caution as poverty
and apprehension allowed. The Italian Legation pressed hard for a delay in the
grant of the Red Sea oil concession, so that Italian interests might make a bid for