مجموعة ٦/ ١٩ "الجزيرة العربية: (المملكة العربية السعودية) التقرير السنوي لمملكة الحجاز ونجد." [و‎‎١‎٥‎٥] (٥٤٠/٣١٠)

[10178] b 4
7
Saudi-Transjordan notes annexed to the treaty :—
(4) Transjordan letter on tribal nationality.
(5) Saudi letter on tribal nationality.
(6) Saudi letter on meetings of special officers.
(7) Transjordan letter on meetings of special officers.
(8) Transjordan letter on the cancellation of raiding claims up to date.
(9) Saudi letter on the cancellation of raiding claims up to date.
Anglo-Saudi notes, not for publication, signed at the same time as the treaty :—
(10) British note on responsibility for fulfilment of Transjordan obligations.
(11) Saudi acknowledgment of (10).
(12) British note on crossing of frontier by British officials in Transjordan.
(13) Saudi acknowledgment of (12).
(14) British note on diplomatic and consular relations between Transjordan
and Saudi Arabia.
(15) Saudi acknowledgment of (14).
(16) British note on Ruwalla tribe.
(17) Saudi acknowledgment of (16).
26. It would be an excess of optimism to suppose that this settlement makes
an end of discord between the parties. It nevertheless makes a very distinct
advance and it provides rational means of adjusting differences, given even a
moderate spirit of goodwill on both sides. Some difficulty arose over the
modalities of ratification, but the necessary instruments were exchanged at Cairo
on the 21st December.
27. It had been agreed in principle at an early stage in these transactions
that Ibn Saud and the Amir Abdullah should consolidate their new-found
. friendship by a personal meeting as soon as the settlement had been completed.
It was further agreed after a good deal of consideration that the meeting should
take place on board a British warship. His Majesty’s Government in the United
Kingdom were at great pains to elaborate a plan whereby the two rulers might
be brought together on board H.M.S. Adventure, which was expected to be
passing through the Red Sea towards the end of January 1934, when they had
been led to suppose that Ibn Saud might be available. When this arrangement
was proposed, he was absorbed in the quarrel with the Imam Yahya, and for
that and other reasons declined the proposal. At the end of the year it was
evident that the various practical difficulties of arranging a meeting in a British
ship would be very great and the outlook as to what might eventually be settled
was completely uncertain.
Tribal Affairs and Raiding.
28. In view of the major developments described above, only a few salient
points need be noted under this heading. The tribes whose affairs were most in
evidence in 1933 were the Beni Atiya and the Sirhan, and these were in evidence,
not so much because of what the tribes themselves did (although the Beni Atiya
did their bit of raiding), as because of Ibn Saud’s attitude in regard to them
and the resentment it aroused in Transjordan, where it is thought that the King
does not quite play the game.
29. Ibn Saud, in fact, plays an Arabian game, older than cricket. He could
not be blamed for showing kindness to the Beni Atiya who had been turned back
into his territory from Transjordan in 1932, but it wms disconcerting to find that
one leader, who had begged successfully to be allowed to stay in Transjordan and
then changed his mind, was received as an honoured guest at the King’s Court.
Another, who had been kept in confinement in Palestine, lest he should incite his
fellow-tribesmen against Ibn Saud, managed to escape, had only to flee into
Saudi Arabia to be pardoned. Thus the British authorities in Transjordan incur
odium by taking measures in the King’s interest and the King gets the credit
of magnanimity towards those who come under his wing.
30. The Beni Atiya are, however, a familiar nuisance. The Transjordan
authorities were much more upset over the Sirhan. This tribe, although no longer
of great numerical importance, has a long past history, in the course of which
they once established themselves in the region of Jauf and Kaf. Settled