مجموعة ٦/ ١٩ "الجزيرة العربية: (المملكة العربية السعودية) التقرير السنوي لمملكة الحجاز ونجد." [ظ‎‎٢‎٠‎٤] (٥٤٠/٤٠٩)

jordan of having been the first to ofiend in this respect. He refused to condemn
En-Neshmi, whom he had dismissed only to avoid controversy He undertook to
instruct Ibn Zeid to meet Captain Glubb on receipt of a reply from His Majesty s
Government, but refused any restitution of loot to Transjordan until a start snou d
have been made on the other side. In his answer under the filth heading m
paragraph 15 above he raised a new point of his own, which was destined o g lv G 9
trouble. He declined the offer of assistance in the Wadi Sirhan, thanking Go
that he had power over all his subjects. The only help he sought, he added, was
that criminals fleeing into Transjordan should be handed back.
17. This reply placed His Majesty’s Government on the horns of a dilemma.
While they considered it in many ways unsatisfactory, they were a\erse from
drastic action such as the occupation of the W adi Sirhan or the temporary re( ^ull
of their Minister. They considered that the reply, evasive though it was, did
not exclude the achievement of their essential purpose, that of bringing about a
meeting of the frontier authorities and the settlement of the questions at u^ue
on a local and tribal basis. They were able to accept the principles by wmch
Ibn Saud wished the two representatives to be governed, although they did so
reluctantly as regards his proposal that decisions relative to important raids
should be taken ad referendum only. There ensued a protracted correspondence,
the details of which need not be reproduced Its upshot may be summed up
as follows :—
(a) It was agreed about mid-April that, in view of the delay in establishing
a complete basis for the examination of raids subsequent to those investigated
by Mr. MacDonnell, Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid should hold a preliminary
meeting limited to more general purposes. His Majesty’s Government wished
that at this meeting the representatives should exchange information and views
as to the best means of policing the frontier. Ibn Sand scouted the idea that
there need be any discussion of measures of police, but His Majesty's Government
did not allow this caveat to stand in the way of the agreement. It was further
agreed, without prejudice to the holding of the preliminary meeting, that
Captain Glubb and ibn Zeid should at once begin to communicate with each
other by wireless.
(b) It remained to settle various points connected with the main meeting to
deal with raids. It was agreed that both Governments should publicly disavow
and condemn all future raiding and that the representatives should be empowered
to supervise the immediate restitution of loot on both sides, as soon as their
decision had been sanctioned by the Government in accordance with the ad
referendum principle reluctantly accepted by His Majesty s Government.
Ibn Saud was most unwilling that the meeting should take the shape of a formal
enquiry involving the examination of witnesses. Eventually, however, he agreed
to a formula permitting the evidence of sheikhs to be taken, when considered
necessary by the representatives, subject to a condition whereby the nationals of
either Power seeking to evade compliance with orders to attend by fleeing into
the territory of the other should be apprehended and handed over to their own
authorities. The correspondence on these various points was completed on the
18th June.
{c) The point raised by Ibn Saud in his original reply of the 3rd March
relative to what came to be known as “the surrender of raiding criminals”
was successfully floated off into a separate channel, so that it should not impede
the arrangements for the meetings between Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid.
18. There had been much cry, but there was little wool. The outcome of all
that had passed may conveniently be stated under the same three heads, as
follows :—
(a) After various delays the preliminary meeting took place on the 3rd June
at Hazim Wells in Transjordan close to the frontier. It was friendly and Ibn
Zeid was quite ready to discuss a much wider range of subjects than might have
been expected from the diplomatic correspondence. He showed himself very
amenable to Captain Glubb’s suggestions until in the end he torpedoed all of them
by explaining that he was not empowered to come to any agreement without
reference to his master. The most that was achieved (and this did not emerge
till long after Captain Glubb had reported that the discussion was generally
inconclusive) was a gentleman’s understanding that neither Government would