مجموعة ٦/ ١٩ "الجزيرة العربية: (المملكة العربية السعودية) التقرير السنوي لمملكة الحجاز ونجد." [و‎‎٢‎٠‎٩] (٥٤٠/٤١٨)

There was nothing to indicate a failure on Ibn Saud's part to establish his
authority over the province as a whole, but he was certainly up against tribal
opposition, notably on the part of the unruly Masariha tribe in the region inland
from Jizan. It is probable that in sending forces to Asir he was as much
concerned with the necessity for controlling the tribes as with that of parrying
danger from the Yemen. The objects were, in any case, closely allied, as tribes
opposed to Ibn Saud would naturally look to the Imam for support, and the
trouble with the latter was definitely ascribed by the Hejazi Government to his
interference outside his own domain. One of the many stories which reached
Jedda was that the advance of Khalid-al-Lowai was seriously delayed by tribal
opposition in the north of Asir, but Ibn Saud would appear to have got the local
situation in hand by October.
38. Two further points may be noted in connexion with the Asir situation,
namely, that, when expressing their views on the situation between Ibn Saud
and the Imam, the Italian Government made considerable play with the hostility
of the local tribes, especially the Masariha, to the King’s annexation of Asir, and
that one of those concerned in the question of Asir would appear to be Seyyid
Ahmed-es-Senussi, who continues to reside under Ibn Saud’s wing in the Hejaz
and who is related to the Idrisi family. This relationship was reinforced, it
would appear, in June by the marriage of Marghani-al-Idrisi to a daughter of
Seyyid Ahmed. There was, however, no indication during the year that the
Idrisi shadow-ruler of Asir himself played any role at all.
39. The new situation resulting from Ibn Saud’s practical annexation of
Asir engaged the attention of His Majesty's Government early in the year. It
was reviewed in a letter addressed by the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office
and the India Office on the 14th February, which analysed the legal situation
with special reference to the effect of the King’s action on the status of Asir
and to the treaty of 1917 between Great Britain and the Idrisi. The Foreign
Secretary inclined to the view that the Idrisi must be regarded as having been
extinguished as an international person, and that the 1917 treaty, even if it had
not previously ceased to operate for other reasons, must be held to have lapsed.
Having regard to the more general considerations, however, including those
connected with the agreements entered into with the Italian Government in the
Rome conversation in 1927, Mr. Henderson proposed, subject to the concurrence
of the departments addressed, to instruct His Majesty’s Minister at Jedda not
to commit His Majesty’s Government to recognition of the absorption of Asir by
Ibn Saud, or to do anything wdiich might imply such recognition without further
instructions. It was given as an additional reason for maintaining intact the
position regarding the 1917 treaty, that it might still be possible to invoke it
usefully in the event of a revival of some measure of Idrisi independence. Before
this proposal had become effective, a new turn was given to the matter by an
innocent-like note to the Legation, dated the 11th March, in which the Hejazi
Minister for Foreign Affairs asked for assistance in the establishment of wireless
communication between Jizan and Aden for commercial purposes and a postal
service between Jizan and Kamaran. In view of the difficulty of dealing with
this request without explicitly refusing to recognise the new status of Asir, or at
least tacitly acquiescing in it both de jure and de jcvcto, the Foreign Office modified
their previous view. They proposed to seek the concurrence of the Italian
Government in their officially recognising the new arrangements, having regard
to the change which had come over the situation since 1927, and the practical
obstacles in the way of refusing to communicate with the Hejazi Government
regarding Asir. The Italian Government were in due course approached on
those lines with the concurrence of the other departments of His Majesty’s
Government concerned. The immediate reaction of the Italian Ministry for
Foreign Affairs was unfavourable. Their objections were later reduced to writing
in a lengthy memorandum of the 25th June, the main thesis of which was that
the annexation of Asir by Ibn Saud only aggravated the situation which existed
at the time of the Rome conversations of 1927, a situation even then pregnant
with danger of conflict between Ibn Saud and the Imam Yahya. The Italian
Government demurred to an assumption in the memorandum which had been
addressed to them that they would themselves have to accept the absorption of
Asir into the Hejaz in the treaty whish they were negotiating with Ibn Saud
[7104] ^ c 2