مجموعة ٦/ ١٩ "الجزيرة العربية: (المملكة العربية السعودية) التقرير السنوي لمملكة الحجاز ونجد." [و‎‎٢‎٢‎٧] (٥٤٠/٤٥٤)

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which, in the end, proved abortive. This was due as much as anything to a
desire on the part of Ibn Saud to be free to use the personnel for all purposes.
He objected to the reinsertion in any new contracts of a clause in the old
entitling the British staff to resign in the event of war. His Majesty’s
^ Government were unwilling to concede this point. Indeed, at the stage now
reached, they began to conceive grave doubts as to the desirability of allowing
British personnel to be used even for the repression of internal disorder. Both
sides were thinking of a situation different from that which had existed when
the original Air Force was recruited in 1929. Ibn Saud, apart from his
difficulties elsewhere, was confronted with a danger of definitely foreign
hostilities in one direction, the Yemen; while the area of possible disaffection
was so much wider than it had been towards the close of the 1929 rebellion that
the use of British personnel to cope with it might, it was thought by His
Majesty’s Government, expose them to odium in the eyes of Indian Moslems. In
the event, this latter question of internal use did not actually arise with Ibn Saud.
His Government were informed on the 30th September that His Majesty’s
Government could in no circumstances agree to British personnel taking part in
hostilities against any foreign Power. This caused the negotiations to peter out
finally in the second half of November, after some further exchange of views, in
the course of which His Majesty’s Government rejected as unpractical a Hejazi
suggestion that the proposed British staff might be used for instructional purposes
only, and flying personnel recruited elsewhere. His Majesty’s Government
discouraged also an idea broached privately by Fuad Bey Hamza to
Mr. Hope Gill on the 7th November, that they might be willing to offer the King a
British air mission.
166. It may be unfortunate from some points of view that these transactions
should have destroyed, so far as can be judged at present, all prospect of further
British participation in an air force created under British auspices as recently
as a couple of years ago. It is possible that, if the personnel recruited in 1929
had been more happily chosen, the story would have had a happier ending. To
that extent His Majesty’s Government do not emerge from the affair without
some diminution of credit. Otherwise, however, the fiasco must be attributed to
the ineptitude of the Hejazi Government who showed no capacity for managing
the force, no inclination to use it intelligently and no readiness to make the
conditions of service really tolerable for the men employed. In cannot be supposed
that there would have been much improvement in these respects had new British
personnel been supplied. In one direction there was every prospect of deteriora
tion, i.e., as regards delay in the payment of salaries. There is, moreover,
nothing to show definitely that the presence of British airmen in Ibn Saud’s
air force would improve the chances of British participation in future aerial
developments in Hejaz-Nejd or of the King taking a less jealous view of the
frequentation of his territory by British aircraft. In the opinion of the writer
of this report His Majesty’s Government were well, if rather ingloriously, out
of a bad business when the negotiations described above broke down.
167. One of the matters outstanding at the end of 1930 was the request of
the Hejazi Government for assistance in obtaining instructional machines,
machine guns and spare parts. The material for a reply to these requests was
sent tc the Legation in January and February, but was held in reserve owing to
the tense situation over the Transjordan frontier question. The reply was
eventually sent to the Hejazi Government on the 18th May. A month later they
explained that they preferred to postpone consideration of the matter owing to
the lack of technical experts. In June they made a separate request for
facilities for the shipment to Jedda via Bahrein and India of 500 bombs, being
half a total number of 1,000 which had been supplied with the original material
for the air force, but had been left at Darin Island when it was transferred to
Jedda. It was agreed that this shipment might be made, subject to compliance
with Board of Trade regulations and measures to separate the detonators from
the bombs.
168. Little progress was made with the question of obtaining Ibn Saud’s
consent to British aircraft flying over his territory adjoining the Persian Gulf.
The King had given no indication of the results of the study of this matter by
his local authorities (see annual report for 1930, paragraphs 142-143). Early