مجموعة ٦/ ١٩ "الجزيرة العربية: (المملكة العربية السعودية) التقرير السنوي لمملكة الحجاز ونجد." [ظ‎‎٢‎٤‎١] (٥٤٠/٤٨٣)

the existence of a political frontier sometimes improves his facilities for retreat
and sometimes cramps his ability to play the old game according to the old rules.
He is slow to appreciate the greater refinement of the sport, just as our ruder
forefathers may have been slow to welcome the introduction of nets and goal-posts
and things into their primitive ball games. His backers in high places see more
clearly how much grist the new system brings to their political mills, especially
if they invoke the old rules or the new according as it suits them. His Majesty’s
Government, interposed between the backers rather than between the tribes, have
had an infinity of trouble. They have made constant efforts to improve the
situation by two methods, viz. : (1) That of reducing ill-feeling by a liquidation
of claims in respect of past raids, and (2) that of putting an end to further
raiding by suitable measures of prevention and repression and trying to induce
Ibn Sand to adopt similar measures.
25. A basis for the first method was provided by the Hadda Agreement
negotiated by Sir Gilbert Clayton in 1925. This defined the frontier between
Transjordan and Nejd and provided inter alia for tribunals to adjudicate on
raids. Attempts to give effect to this judicial procedure failed and the problem
(which had been enlarged by the completion of Ibn Saud’s conquest of the Hejaz
soon after the conclusion of the Hadda Agreement) was still unsolved at the time
of Sir Gilbert Clayton's final negotiations in 1928. As has already been stated
elsewhere these negotiations failed of their main object, but they brought to a
head a proposal for the settlement of Transjordan frontier claims by arbitration.
This broke down in its first form, but led to another arrangement, namely, that
His Majesty’s Government should themselves arbitrate, on the understanding that
Ibn Saud and the Emir Abdullah should give them carte blanche. The first step
towards giving effect to this final proposal was the appointment of an investigator
to go into all claims in respect of past raiding on behalf of His Majesty’s
Government. The officer chosen for this purpose was Mr. M. S. MacDonnell, a
retired Sudan civil servant who had had considerable experience of tribal matters
and had later been High Commissioner at Danzig. After many preliminaries,
which took up much time, he arrived in Jedda on the 3rd June,' 1930, to confer
in the first instance with Ibn Baud. The latter showed a very curious conception
of carte blanche and it was only after most difficult negotiations with him and
his advisers tha.t a more or less reasonable basis for the investigation was agreed
upon. The principal point laid down, subject to a similar agreement being
reached with the Emir, were that the Hejazi Government should be represented
at the enquiry by an agent and that selected spokesmen should represent the
tribes concerned, while the Hejaz Government agent should speak for persons
not identified with tribes as such. Mr. MacDonnell in due course arrived at
roughly similar arrangements with the Emir Abdullah.
26. It would take too long to describe all the difficulties which dogged the
path of Mr. MacDonnell. From the outset Ibn Saud firmly refused to give him
access to Nejd territory. After he had chosen Amman as his headquarters, he
had to wait weeks for the Hejazi agent, who, after missing two steamers,
accomplished the tour de force of going overland to Amman by car, picking up
tribal spokesmen on the way. He was most difficult over important points of
procedure and they had to be settled by direct negotiations with the Hejazi
Government. During the Jedda conversations in June Ihn Saud had airily
suggested that all Mr. MacDonnell need do was to go through the Hejazi Govern
ment’s files and accept their conclusions, as they had been reached after the
fullest enquiry, but the ineptitude of their preparation of their case was proved
when their agent had to make 259 corrections in a statement of 248 Hejaz-Nejd
claims. The investigation almost broke down over certain personal incidents,
in one of which the Hejazi Government complained that their honour had been
outraged by insults levelled at their agent by a leading Transjordan sheikh.
Other difficulties arose over cases involving the inevitable Ibn Mashhur, with
whose past raids from Nejd into Transjordan the Hejazi Government refused to
have anything to do in the investigation so long as he remained unsurrendered
by Iraq; and cases involving the Beni Atiya tribe, which they refused to accept
as being excluded from the investigation by the fact that the principal leaders
had crossed into Nejd, unless assurances were given that the return to Trans
jordan not only of those leaders, but of other less determinate persons would not
be tolerated.