مجموعة ١/١٥ "شؤون مصر: الوضع العام ١٩٣١؛ المعاهدة البريطانية المصرية، ١٩٣٦" [و‎‎٢‎٠] (٤٩٣/٤٠)

19
jJeputies, meeting in camer'a on 26th
November, had considered the results of
the London negotiations and granted the
Government a vote of confidence; and that
the Egyptian Government were therefore
in a position to sign the treaty with its
two annexes.
It is now necessary to resume the
narrative of events affecting the budan
which was broken off at the end of para
graph 50. While in London Sn H-
Huddleston had recommended that Sayed
Abdel Rahman el Mahdi, the leader of the
Independence groups, should be permitted
to come to London to state his case (a
proposal which had earlier been made b}
the Sayed and discouraged by His
Majesty’s Government). This recommenda
tion was approved, and it was in addition
made clear that if the leaders of the other
influential Sudanese parties wished to lay
their views before His Majesty’s Govern
ment they would be welcome to do so. In
the event none were received. The follow
ing is extracted from the official Sudan
Monthly Record for October-November
1946 :—
“ On 26th November Sayed Sir Abdel
Rahman el Mahdi Pasha left Khartoum,
i with one companion and his doctor, by
air for London on his own initiative to
explain to the British Government his
views on the rumoured Sudan clauses of
the proposed treaty. The Sayed s
journey was not undertaken at the
instance of the Sudan Government.
Sayed Ali El Mirghani later made it
clear that he did not intend to visit the
United Kingdom. On the eve of his
departure Sayed Abdel Rahman visited
Sayed Sir Ali El Mirghani Pasha for
the first time for many years, a courtesy
greatly appreciated by the followers of
both leaders. Sayed Sir Abdel Rahman
on his departure also issued a message
to all Sudanese, regardless of sect or
party, stating that he intended to set
before both Condominium Governments
the twin aims of termination of the
Condominium rule and recognition of
Sudenese sovereignty and the setting up
of a transitional Sudanese Government
to pave the way for a free democratic
Government at the earliest possible
The Sayed called for unity, prudence and
caution in the critical period through
which the country was passing.”
58. The Sayed saw the Prime Minister
on 27th November and Lord Stansgate on
29th November. He was received by the
Minister of State on 5th December and on
19th December. He also paid a courtesy
call on the Foreign Secretary, who had just
returned from the United States, on 21st
December, the eve of his departure. The
substance of the assurances given to the
Sayed by the Prime Minister, and subse
quently repeated, was that the draft pro
toeol made no difference to the present
status of the Sudan or its administration;
that nothing in it could prejudice the right
of the Sudanese people to achieve their
complete independence; and that the
existence of a union between the Sudan
and Egypt created by a common Crown did
not alter the right of the Sudanese to
decide their future. The Governor-General
would resist any form of direct Egyptian
administration, which would be contrai\
to the protocol. The following is a further
extract from the Sudan Monthly Record:
“ Public anxiety and controversy
began, however, to shift from the
question whether British acknow ledg
ment of Egyptian sovereignty meant a
change in status, and, if so, a breach oi
Mr. Bevin s promise of 26th March, to
the profound differences now made
public between press reports of Sidky
Pasha’s interpretation of the protocol
and the description of it given to the
British House of Commons on 28th
October. Mr. Attlee had said there
would be no change in status noi oi
administration and no impairment of the
Sudanese right ultimately to decide their
own future. Sidky Pasha was reported
by the Cairene dailies to have stated that
the draft implied a full share for Egypt
in the administration, and no right of
ultimate secession should the Sudanese
wish to take that course; independence
could, however, later be granted by
Egypt, though Sidky Pasha thought the
demand for it could never arise. Less
eminent commentators in all three
countries continued to give thoroughly
confusing and contradictory interpreta
tions, until the most widespread public
feeling in the Sudan appeared to have
become one of impatience with the vei bal
quibbling which the formula invited and
to which the negotiations appeared to
have been reduced, tempered with
anxiety as to what would have to be done
should the outcome be as thoroughly
unsatisfactory as the published differ
ences over interpretation appeared to be.
The feeling of resentment that the future
of the country should be so bandied
between the Co-domini and between the
Egyptian political parties, without con
sultation of the Sudanese, remained
strong.”
d 2
86-10