مجموعة ١/٥٤(س) "لجنة الشرق الأوسط (الرسمية): إعادة الإعمار" [و‎‎٤‎٤‎٦] (٩٤٠/٨٩٥)

SECRET
TRANSJORDAN*
E CONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, RE-SETTLEMENT OF
EFUGEE 8 AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
The Problem.
Transjordan is likely to come out of the Palestine
settlement v/ith a considerably increased area and
population, having acquired the central part of Arab
Palestine. The resident population will be raised from
some 400,000 to some 800,000. There are also about
300,000 Arab refugees in Transjordan and what is now
■Arab Palestine and this number may be increased by the
addition of refugees moving in from the Lebanon and
Syria. A large proportion of these are women and
children,
Transjordan has show n itself the most reasonable of
the Arab States in the Palestine question, the best
organised militarily and socially the most cohesive.
The alliance v/ith His Majesty’s Government is a
corner stone of Transjordan policy. It is in H.M.G’s
military and political interest that the greater
Transjordan should become a viable state with a rising
standard of living and in close relations with H.M.G.
The United Nations are providing for the short-term
maintenance of Arab refugees but there is no internat
ional scheme for their re-settlement. This will have
to be treated country by- country. By far the heaviest
weight falls on Transjordan. The re-settlement of these'
refugees is a pressing humanitarian task and any contrib
ution which H.M.G. can make .to it will produce rich
political dividends.
The present financial situation of Transjordan is
precarious. The budget is more or less in balance at a
very low figure. External payments are only balanced
as a result of H.M.G’s subsidy for the Arab Legion
amounting for 1949/50 to a total of £ 3i million and by
means of the temporary expedient of obtaining (with H.M.G’s
permission) by the sterling obtained from the redemption
of Palestine currency notes imported from Syria and the
Lebanon and brought in by refugee's., This expedient cannot
last longer than.about the end of this year at the most.
Transjordan’s ability to pay for imports^ with exports has
been gravely reduced by the refugees who have consumed what
is normally the exportable surplus of commodities,.
It was thought some time ago that a general subsidy
and rehabilitation grant from external sources would have
to be provided if the administration of Greater Transjordan
was to get^going at all. H.M. Minister at Amman now advises
that this is not at present nece.ssary and that while stealing
is available from the redemption of Palestine currency notes,
Transjordan can support■itself provided that the burden of
providing for refugees is lifted, and that the subsidy for
the Arab Legion is maintained at its present figure.
While it is a direct British strategic interest that
the Arab Legion should be maintained as an effective course,