ملف ١٩١٦/٣٣٦٠ الجزء ٢ "مراسلات بلاد فارس. (١٩١٧-١٩١٨)" [ظ‎‎٤‎٣] (٦٧٨/٩١)

a force might unduly rouse tribal opposition and now proposes that while he
himself should send a force to Abadeh by main road, leaving a^ garrison and a
Deputy Governor there, a force of Kashgais under the Illbegi should march
towards Sarhad to punish Darashuris. To put in one of his own sons as
Deputy Governor is his present idea.
In the meantime Sardar Ehtesham remains at Firuzabad to keep an eye
on Soulat who has a much larger following in the south than was supposed.
The Farsimaidan tribe is said to have followed him possibly _ as result of
disturbances in the north. Unless these disturbances are dealt with very soon
effect throughout tribal territory would soon be felt.
To deal with Soulat in case of necessity Sardar Ehtesham must, therefore,
keep a force at Firuzabad. Cost of Illkhanis , Ulbegis* forces is estimated at
about tomans 800 a day each for a period of a month or six weeks, possibly
two months. Five times this amount is asked by rapacious Kashgai leaders,
but Governor-General has cut it down to what he considers lower figure. It
will be necessary, besides above, to pay something though nothing like on the
same scale, for Governor-General’s own force. Illbegis ask for rifles and
ammunition but Staff are unwilling to lend former pending restoration of
those taken from South Persia Rifles posts by Illbegis and Arabs (now in
possession of Kawam). It is necessary two expeditions should start,
without delay, to Abadeh which would be expedient. I am, therefore,
advancing about 15,000 tomans for their expenses. It is necessary also
that Ulkhanis should be paid something. He will be supine without money
and Soulat’s troubles will break out afresh. If troops move in the direction of
Firuzabad from Bushire this threat will be much diminished. Sykes with
whom I have discussed situation concurs with me. In receiving no news of
events in Bushire hinterland I am somewhat hampered, I would be grateful
if reply to my telegram, No. 82 of the 12th August, could be sent as soon as
possible. Without Government’s further explicit sanction I dislike responsibility
of spending these large sums of money which, if the danger of recrudescence
of late troubles is to be avoided, must be spent.
This is with reference to my telegram, No. 84.
93
Telegram P., No. 1001-S., dated the 21st August 1918.
From—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and
Political Department, Simla,
To—His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran (repeated to the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf and Civil Commissioner in Mesopotamia, Baghdad).
Government of India while appreciating value of Haig’s advice think
that negotiations with Zafar and Khans and general direction should be left in
hands of Force “ D ”, so far as possible, who will make necessary arrange
ments through Dr. Young and Ahwaz with Bakhtiaris. If Consul-General,
Ispahan, intervenes it will only confuse matters. Haig should be instructed
accordingly if you agree.
This is with reference to Consul-General, Ispahan’s telegrams 35 and 38 of
August 1918.
99
(Received with Army Department memorandum No. 11318, dated the 22nd August 1918.)
Telegram P., No. M. D.-00251, dated the 16th (received 17tb) August 1918.
From — General Malleson, Meshed,
To—The Chief of the General Staff, Simla.
To-day I warned the Trans-Caspian delegate that my accounts of disorder
and indiscipline amongst their forces were so bad that it seems probable that
failing drastic remedies, they would lose everything, because of their Jack of
trust in Soviet. Large numbers of Russians, who should be fightin^, were
doing nothing, that anxious as we were to help them, we had our own interests-