"ملف XXII\١ علاقات الكويت مع الحكومة البريطانية" [و‎‎٩] (٣٨٢/١٧)

Telegram, dated the 25th May 1904.
From—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, Londrm
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To—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla.
Please refer to your telegram dated the 20th May 1904 regarding Nejd
affairs. Representations were made by Sir N. O’Conor to the Porte on your
telegram of the 28th April and were renewed on hearing from the Vice-
Consul at Jeddah that troops were being assembled at Medina in order to
assist the Amir of Nejd. He says that these representations may perhaps
make the Sultan reluctant, hut that they will hardly turn him from the
course which he can fairly urge is calculated to prevent internal troubles and
disturbance of the status quo. He adds that he does not see on what grounds
he can press the Turks to desist from helping the Amir, who is the party
attacked without appearing as a distinct partisan of Bin Saud. He also ad
verts to questions of general policy, and points out that on these grounds there
are objections against preventing the Turks from assisting the Amir against
Bin Saud whose apparent object is to re-establish the Wahabi dynasty through
out Central Arabia, result of which might in the near future be fraught with
serious consequences and might imperil our authority at Koweit where in the
existing condition of affairs our influence is yearly growing stronger. Sir N.
O’Conor’s idea is that we should confine ourselves for the present to maintain
ing intact territory of Koweit and awaiting developments, but that if the
Turks persist, as he anticipates, in assisting the Amir, it might be expedient to
reconsider the question of appointing a Resident at Koweit. Please let me have
your views on the above questions. In view of our declared policy of prohibit
ing the traffic in arms, how would you propose to keep from interfering with
the importation of arms for Bin Saud ?
Please see your telegram of the 25th May 1904. uur position in regard to
the affairs of Nejd is explained in our Secret Despatch No. 69 of 24th March
1904. Representations might be made by Sir N. O’Conor to the effect that so long
as the Turks refrained from interference in Nejd affairs, we also abstained from
intervention ; that we have no desire to assist Bin Saud directly or indirectly;
but that our interests in Eastern Arabia are such that we cannot view with
indifference intervention on behalf of one of the parties contending for supre
macy in Nejd which must affect the tribes with which we have relations; that
the relative rights of the two contending parties being so equal that the better
course would be to leave both sides alone, both in the interests of peace and with
a view to the avoidance of internal troubles. It might further be pointed out
that the Turks were unable in 1902 to prevent filibustering expedition against
Koweit starting from Turkish territory, and that the present support of Bin
Rashid may strengthen him beyond Turkish powers of control, and produce
situation which, having regard to our relations with Mubarak, we could not view
with indifference. As to Sir N. O’Conor’s view of the general political aspect
of the situation, our opinion is as follows : the growth of our influence with
Sheikh Mubarak has been concurrent with the success of his friend, Bin Saud,
and our prestige at Koweit must suffer materially if, through our active inter
vention to prevent Mubarak assisting Bin Saud, and to prevent importation
of arms, we permit Turkish influence to determine supremacy of the Turkish
nominee against Bin Saud, which on analogy of the case of El Hassa of 1871
would probably mean absorption of Nejd by the Turks. The destruction of
Mubarak’s influence and a possible attack from a direction which has not hither
to been contemplated on Koweit territory, the limits of which towards the in
terior are not defined, would naturally result from Turkish supremacy in Nejd.
Telegram No. 1748-E.A., dated the 29th May 1904.
From—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla,
To—His Majesty’s Secretary o£ State for India, Lo
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