ملف ٣٥١٦\١٩١٤ الجزء ١٨ "الحرب الألمانية: بلاد فارس؛ الوضع العام - ١٩١٦" [ظ‎‎٨] (٣٦٨/٢٥)

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been selected for an attack on this legation, and it was on this night that the Turkish
Ambassador was on the watch to come to our defence. My confidence, however, in the
moral effect of Russian troops within easy reach to prevent disturbance was justified,
and we slept as usual.
Monday, the 15th November, was a critical day. At 9.30 a.m. Sipahdar am*"
Samsam-us-Sultaneh came to the legation and announced that the Shah found it
impossible to remain in his capital while Russian troops were at the gates, and that
His Majesty intended to remove the Court and Government. I said that the Russian
Minister and I had explained to His Majesty only the day before the reason of the
movement of the troops, namely, the necessity of protecting the two legations and the
large British and Russian colonies in Tehran from being treated like our consuls in so
many Persian towns; we had shown great and even excessive patience, but when
the diplomatic representatives of the two Powers were threatened, it was impossible
for them to remain passive. The measure was entirely precautionary, and the instructions
given to the troops were that so long as there were no disorders in Tehran the
troops would remain at Keredj. Their Excellencies would probably like to have this
assurance from the Russian Minister, and I had already telephoned to him at Zerguendeh
to ask him to come into town. (I must here explain that the Russian Legation was
being transferred from its old premises in an old and most disagreeable quarter to a
large garden contiguous to His Majesty’s Legation, but that the necessary alterations in
the new house were not undertaken till very late in the summer, so that M. de Etter
was compelled to remain at his country residence—a most inconvenient arrangement.
The French Minister and I had offered to find accommodation for himself and most of
his staff, but his Excellency had always declined. However, on the 17th he consented
to become my guest until the 29th November, when it was possible for him to occupy
his own house. The spectacle of the Russian Minister lodged in the British Legation
has caused no little amusement in Tehran.) M. de Etter appeared about 12.30, and
repeated the a ssurances I had already given. Mostofi-ul-Mamalik had since asserted
to me that the assurances I gave at this moment decided the Shah to remain in his
capital. If it w T as so, I can only say that at the meeting of “Elder Statesmen” to
which my Russian colleague and I were invited in the afternoon both acting and staging
were incomparable.
After a hasty lunch we reached the Derbar at 1.45 p.m., and in a small waiting
room met Ain-ed-Dowleh, Motemin-ul-Mulk, Mushir-ed-Dowleh, Mostofi-ul-Mamalik,
Motesham-es-Sultaneh, Shaheb-ed-Dowleh, and Vosugh-ed-Dowleh. They informed us
that the Shah could not tolerate the presence of foreign troops so close to the capital
and that, unless we ordered them to withdraw, His Majesty would leave Tehran at once.
We replied that the troops had come, as we had explained to His Majesty the Shah,
with no unfriendly purpose, but solely in order to guarantee us against the German
forces ; and we pointed out how* necessary their presence was as in spite of the promises
the Government had made to us when the troops first moved from Kazwin that the
German mujahids would be arrested, the Austrian soldiers removed all the depots of
arms, &c., seized, absolutely nothing had been done to fulfil these assurances; the
Government in fact was incapable of dealing with the situation created by its
own toleration of German agitation. After some three hours’ discussion, in the
course of which white-faced messengers from the Shah came in every few
minutes to repeat that His Majesty was getting into his carriage, or to summon a
Minister to soothe the Imperial agitation, we finally agreed to recommend to our
Governments the following arrangement: that the Cabinet should be reconstructed by
the inclusion of Ain-ed-Dowleh and Farman Farma so as to give a guarantee to the two
Powers that the Persian Government would carry out the engagement it had already
accepted in consideration of the financial support given them by means of the
moratorium, and that when the Cabinet had been actually formed and conversations had
commenced as to the measures to be taken for that purpose the troops should be removed
ta Yengi Imam, i.e., about half way to Kazwin, and eventually to Kazwin itself. I
then suggested that it might reassure the Shah if M. de Etter and I personally
informed him of the proposed arrangement. The suggestion was adopted with alacrity
and we went across the gardens which separate the Derbar from the Palace, and
entering the orangery which leads to the rooms in which the Shah usually grants
audiences we found assembled on the stairs all the great Persian princes and dignitaries,
Kamram Mirza, Akber Mirza, Shoa-es-Sultaneh, Farman Farma, Samsam-es-Sultaneh,
and many others.
The Shah himself was painfully agitated. His usual high colour had vanished, and
his face and hands were constantly twitching, and he had all the appearance of not