ملف ١٩١٦/٣٥٧٩ "تركيا: مستقبل القسطنطينية" [ظ‎‎٧‎١] (٥٣٠/١٥١)

M'-lf'
t
■ lijtic’r
1 -,!
| li
,1
6 . Admitting this argument, it remains to be examined what method of holding
the gate we can accept as providing sufficient security.
Should Turkey be dispossessed, candidates to be considered m g
(a.) Greece,
(b.) The United States or
(c.) Ourselves.
/„ \ It wou ld no t be desirable to allow Greece to occupy Constantinople even
“ :rL - ““
“tSTdta'SpS 1 "4 23S - «” p "
would probably meet with too much opposition for it to be a Poetical propo •
The candidature of France and Italy have not been considered sm^ they are as
undesirable as America from the naval point of view, from which it is essential that
Constantinople and the Straits should be held by a weak naval power.
7 The Admiralty would prefer to see the Straits internationalized with free
mssane for ships of all descriptions, all forts and other defences completely destroyed
and a commission similar to the Danube Commission to administer the waterways.
Thus Turkey might be left in possession under international guarantees. s -
This solution would be acceptable to the General Staff provided the Straits
remained untunnelled and unbridged, and that a Turkey friendly ^ om^lve 8 was
ensured. In this connection it has already been suggested that we “ ^ e . ov £
and administer the country. The invitation is under investigation but should it be
politically desirable, its acceptance wo.dd be militarily advantageous, tor ,
surest guardians of our own interests and a predominant position at Constantinople
would place under our control a ready-made Turkish garrison to bar the road to *
East. This would be an important consideration m relation to post-war uarrisons
overseas.
8. So far Constantinople only has been considered as a crossing into Asia
Minor,*but it must always be remembered that there is another route across the Caucasus.
If we can ensure the security of Constantinople as well as t hat of the Caucasus against
any prospect of invasion, we shall have only the Orenburg-Tashkent line to fear leading
towards India, and we shall be strategically satisfied from the military point of view tor
such time as we can now see into the future.
9. The conclusion is that our naval and military interests will best be served if
Turkey remains in possession of Constantinople and the Straits, but that the sea passage
must be internationalized, and we must close with any offer made by the Turks for our
tutelage over themselves, so as to obtain a benevolent buffer State controlled by us
between Europe and our Eastern possessions.
1:4 1
General Staff,
War Office,
22nd December, 191S.
Note.
This paper has been submitted to the Admiralty, who concur.