"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. مجلد I" [ظ‎‎١‎٠‎٩] (٤٥٤/٢٢٣)

196 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
If there is no change in Turkish numbers and dispositions,
it is thought that an opportunity should present itself
of concentrating your forces in such a way that you will
be able to defeat them piecemeal.”
The Mesopotamia Commission took the evidence of Generals
Sir Beauchamp Duff and Sir John Nixon with reference to the
exact intention and interpretation of these orders. The
“occupation of the Basra Vilayet’' meant the occupation of
Nasiriya and Amara, and General Nixon was so informed while
at Army Headquarters. The occupation of Nasiriya had been
suggested by the India Office in December, and the authorities
in India and Mesopotamia had inferred from the correspondence
exchanged that it was the intention of H.M. Government that
both Amara and Nasiriya should be occupied sooner or later.
By asking General Nixon to submit plans for their occupation
and for a subsequent advance to Baghdad, Sir Beauchamp Duff
stated that he was only doing what seemed prudent in view of
possible eventualities. These plans were only meant for
execution should H.M. Government issue orders to that effect,
and until they did so telegraphic orders could easily restrict
the scope of operations to the required extent. Sir John
Nixon, however, informed the Commission that he took the
instructions as meaning that he was to take the offensive
rather than remain on the defensive ; in fact, that he looked
on them as indicating a change of policy.
On the 5th April, General Nixon arrived at Bushire on his way
to Basra. The situation in Ears and at Bushire was disquieting
owing to the anti-British activities of Turco-German agents.
But the Government of India impressed on General Nixon
the importance of avoiding any action in Bushire beyond
what was necessary to safeguard the life and property of
British subjects. On the 9th April, he arrived at Basra and took
over command of Force “ D.” General Barrett, whose health
had been failing, proceeded to India three days later. He
had thus to hand over his task at the very moment that a
decisive action appeared to be imminent.
The 30th Infantry Brigade, consisting of the 24th and
76th Punjabis and the 2/7th Gurkhas, under command of
Major-General C. J. Melliss, had reached Basra on the 6th
April; and the fourth battalion of the 33rd Brigade (the
11th Rajputs) on the 9th April. During the preceding month
the British dispositions had undergone some adjustment in
order to meet the changes in the situation. Qurna garrison
had been reduced, the size of the force at Ahwaz had