"ملاحظات وزارة الخارجية. تجارة الأسلحة في الخليج الفارسي." [و‎‎٢] (٢٢/٣)

J"''
In our despatch No. 24, dated the 21st February 1907, we drew the attention of His
Majesty’s Government to the growing import-
No. 904 in Secret E., May 1907, Nos. 86G-93G. ance ^ ^ arms traffic in the Persian Gulf
and to the alarming increase in its extent since 1903. We pointed out the injurious effects
the trade was already producing in Persian and Turkish territory and the difficulties which
it must eventually raise for us on the North-Western Frontier of India, and we prophesied
that the time would come in the next few years when every fighting tribesman in Afghanistan
and on our frontier would possess a modern weapon. We expressed the opinion that, in view
of the impossibility of effective action for its suppression ever being taken by the Persian
authorities, the arms traffic would continue to flourish and increase until the agreement
with the French which we had advocated in our despatch No. 112, dated the 30th July 1903,
was concluded and a complete prohibition was
No. 20 in Secret E., September 1903, x os. - . en f oroe d. against the importation of arms and
ammunition into the territories of the Sultan of Maskat. If this effect could be obtained by
negotiation, the necessity of resorting to other expensive makeshifts would be obviated.
Inter alia, we suggested the advisability of adopting measures to suppress the arms trade
at Koweit by revising the Maskat proclamation*
* No. 90 in Secret E., July 1898, Nos. 17-32 . of 1898 so as to include exports, as well as
imports, and we recommended that the Porte should be asked to extend to us the right to
search vessels flying the Turkish flag.
The Secretary of State replied on the 29th March 1907, suggesting that we should continue
to collect information and statistics with a view
No. 925 in Secret E., May 1907, Nos. 866-936. ^
bringing
our recommendations before the
Arms Conference which was to meet at Brussels in 1908.
2. The hopes which were expressed in our despatch of 1907, that the problem was to
be solved by negotiations having as their ultimate result the closing of Maskat as a
distributing centre, are now not likely to be realised. The negotiations with France have been
suspended ° Sir E. Grey does not entertain any great hope that the French Government will
make the concessions we desire, and he feels that any Convention which could be arranged
would be practically valueless. Assuming therefore that, so far as the arms traffic is concerned,
the Brussels Arms Conference has failed, it is imperative now to decide whether we are to
permit the trade to continue unchecked, and if not, what measures to adopt for its suppression.
3. The experience of the past two years confirms the views and apprehensions expressed
No. 904 in Secret E , May 1907, Nos. 866-936. iu our despatch of 1907.
The naval forces at our disposal in the Gulf have been shown to be quite inadequate to
patrol the Mekran Coast effectively, and the few captures which have been made have only
sufficed to irritate the Afghans without appreciably checking the trade.
In the years 1907, 1908, 1909 as the result of our operations only 1,950 rifles and 175,000
rounds of ammunition have been captured and 500 rifles and 50,000 rounds of ammunition
jettisoned to avoid capture. As Mr. Holland says a the efforts hitherto made to^check the
arms traffic by sea can only be described as unsystematic, half-hearted and ineffectual”.
The influx of modern arms to Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier has steadily
increased. In 1906-07 the value of arms and ammunition imported into Maskat amounted
to Rs. 16,85,075. In 1907-08 the value had risen to Rs. 41,85,760. Figures for 190^-09
are not yet available. In the report on the administration of the borders of the North-West
Frontier Province for the year 1908-09, Sir G. Roos-Keppel writes as follows It is com
puted that in the last three years 90,000 rifles (viz., 15,000 in 1907, 35,000 in 1908 and
40 000 in 1909) have left the Gulf for Afghanistan, and it is safe to assume that the bulk
of this import has found its way, or will do so, to the best market—the tribal territory of the
North-West Frontier. Of these rifles the percentage of Martinis has dropped from 82% in
1907, to 75% in 1909, with a corresponding increase in the percentage of *303 and other small
bore high velocity rifles.”
So far there are no indications that the market is in any way glutted, and the question of
our future policy must depend on a consideration of the ultimate effects which an unchecked
supply of modern weapons may be expected to produce with reference to (a) Afghanistan, (b)
the North-West Frontier, and (c) Internal India.
As regards (a), we have abundant evidence that the trade receives direct encouragement
from the Afghan Government with the apparent object of providing every tribesman with a
modern rifle. In August 1908 it was reported that the Amir had granted general permission
to Afghan traders to bring arms and ammunition from the Persian Gulf and had even
authorised advances to respectable traders for the purpose. In October 1908 the British
A^ent at Kabul reported that a circular letter had been issued to all local Hakims
throughout Eastern Afghanistan, authorising them to grant a loan to any indigent Afghan
subject who may wish to purchase a rifle; and more recently we have been told that
Sardar Nasrulla Khan has been receiving our tribesmen at Jalalabad, making special arrange
ments for the sale of rifles to Mohmands and Afridis, and telling them to proclaim far