"ملاحظات وزارة الخارجية. تجارة الأسلحة في الخليج الفارسي." [ظ‎‎٢] (٢٢/٤)

2
and wide that those who wish to buy good and cheap rifles should proceed to Jalala
bad without delay. The question of addressing the Amir on this subject was discussed
last September in connection with the suggestion contained in the Secretary of Statens
, « oor. despatch No. 16 of the 14th August 1908, that,
’ if arms are required for arming the people of
Afghanistan, with the Amir’s permission, some other means might be devised for obtaining
them which would not involve the traffic through Persia with the tribes on our side of the line.
On this subject Mr. Clarke’s notes of 2nd
notes, pages 8 anu . September 1803 and 2nd October 1908 may be
read. We decided that the time was not opportune to make any communication to the
Amir on the subject, and in any case it may be doubted whether, so long as no attempt is
made to stop the Persian Gulf source of supply, anything we might say to the Amir would
have any effect in preventing the present wholesale arming of Afghanistan.
5. The effect which the arming of the frontier tribesmen with modern weapons is having,
and will have in the future, on the problem of frontier defence, has recently been brought
prominently to notice, and has found expression in requests for increases to the strength of the
Frontier Militia Corps and in recommendations for their re-armament. It has been pointed
out that the tribesmen are now better armed than the local forces which we maintain to
control them, and that the Militia Corps have in consequence lost the superiority which better
arms and discipline gave to them in the past and which enabled them to cope successfully with
raiding bands of greater numerical strength. The raiders on the other hand have gained
confidence. It must be admitted that recent events in Kurram, Zhob, and on the Waziristan
frontier lend considerable support to this argument. Unless the objection from a military
point of view to re-arming the Militia with ’SO-'i rifles are relaxed, the difficulties experienced
by the Militia Corps must be enhanced in proportion as the number of modern weapons in the
hands of the tribesmen increases.
6. So far as internal India is concerned, the danger is problematical. Hitherto illicit
traffic in arms has been from British India to the border, but it seems to be a matter of
legitimate speculation whether there may not come a time, assuming that the supply through
Persia proceeds unchecked, when the North-West Frontier will become a possible source
from which the forces of sedition in India will obtain a supply of weapons and ammunition.
7. It may be argued that it is too late for effective measures to be taken, that the evil
is already done and the stock of rifles and ammunition already in Afghanistan and the North-
West Frontier so large as to make any increase thereto a matter of comparatively small
importance. It is difficult to estimate the exact value which attaches to this argument, but
we may at any rate assume that at present the number of *303 rifles is proportionately
small. Moreover, improvements in firearms are continually being made, and we may
soon be discarding the '303 for a superior weapon. The importance of checking the influx
of still more modern weapons and possibly of Q. F. guns (for a recent report shows that
parts of such have lately been imported into Maskat), cannot be overestimated.
When we addressed the Secretary of State on the subject in our telegram of the 6th
• No. 232 in Secret E., February 1909, No«. 188-242. Ja ° uar y 1909,* there was still some hope of a
satisfactory solution of the problem through
negotiations, and in the circumstances we were not prepared to recommend a scheme of increased
naval activity to which it was considered there were political as well as financial objections.
8. The position has now altered and, unless we are prepared to face the dangers which
are likely to result from a laissez faire policy, we must adopt the course which all authorities
agree to be the only one which offers any hope of success, viz., a naval blockade with the
supplementary measures necessary to make it effective.
9. His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, in his letter of the 7th May,
expresses the opinion that an effective blockade can be established if the following measures
be taken : —
(a) A force of either (1) four 2nd or 3rd class cruisers or (2) three 2nd or 3rd class
cruisers in addition to two of the subsidised vessels with full complement
white crews instead of lascars.
(i) All these vessels to be fitted with wireless installations and in addition a wireless
station to be established at Jask, The latter proposal we have already recom-
mendedf to the Secretary of State
f No. 719 in Secret E., October 1908, Nos. 718-721. and we have also expressed the
opinion’!' that the subsidised
vessels should be fitted with wireless installations on general grounds inde
pendently of measures for the suppression of the arms traffic. The cost of these
installations should not therefore be regarded as part of the cost of the naval
blockade.
(c) The guard at the telegraph station at Jask to be reinforced to a total strength of
102 rifles as was done in 1908 and 1909.
{d) Arrangements for intelligence similar to those made in the past by Mr. New to be
continued but to be in charge of a special intelligence officer.
Whether the results, so far as the peace of the frontier is concerned, which the execution
of this scheme may be expected to achieve, will be commensurate with the expenditure involved,