"ملاحظات وزارة الخارجية. تجارة الأسلحة في الخليج الفارسي." [و‎‎٣] (٢٢/٥)

©
Nos. 207 and 214 in Secret E.,
207-222.
December 1907, Noe.
must largely depend on military considerations, but we may at any rate hope that its success
would obviate a portion of the additional increase to the forces of protection on the frontier
which the further arming of the tribes may render necessary.
10. Other points which suggest themselves for consideration are—
(a) Can these measures be advantageously supplemented by arrangements—
(1) with the Sultan of Maskat or
(2) with the Baluch Mirs as suggested by Mr. Holland?
(&) Would it be necessary to increase the Sultau's subsidy ?
(c) Is it probable that the traders can defeat the blockade by having recourse to other
centres of distribution or by other means ?
11. As to (a), Mr. Holland suggests that it might be desirable to purchase the Sultan's
co-operation in the prohibition of exports to the Mekran Coast in accordance with his Procla-
N<*. 8y-90 In Secret B, Jul, 1898, No.. 17-325. ” ation a " < } Notification promulgated in 1898
by a monthly payment of Rs. 5,0U0, in return
for which the Sultan would undertake to prevent all exports from Oman ports to the Mekran
Coast. Major Cox' criticism appears to me effectually to dispose of this proposal, for, firstly,
the Sultan obviously has no means of making the prohibition effective, and, secondly, His
H ighness is precluded from prohibiting all export by sea by Article 11 of the French Treaty
which runs as follows :—‘‘ Mo vessel sha’l be prohibited from importing into or exporting from
the territories of the Sultan any kind of merchandise".
The proposal to purchase by subsidies the assistance of influential men in Persian Mekran
was put forward by Captain McConaghey in
1907. The Governmeut of India agreed with
the Agent to the Governor-General in Balu
chistan that the proposal could not be a accepted, for as the Persian Sardars in most instances
derived profit from the trade, no reliance could be placed on their co-operation in suppres
sing the smuggling of arms in return for a subsidy. Major Cox expresses a similar opinion
now, and with it we may agree.
12. As to (6). it is perhaps premature to discuss the desirability of compensating the
Sultan in the event of the measures adopted by us resulting in the crippling of the trade and
the consequent loss of the revenue the Sultan derives from the imports. Mr. Holland states
that the Sultan would in the circumstances have no legitimate grounds of complaint at the
disappearance of his ill-gotten gains. This is no doubt perfectly true, but the Sultan would
hardly look at it in the same light, and the loss of a large proportion of his revenue, however
legitimately effected, would not tend to make him favourably disposed to the power by whose
action it had been brought about, and would certainly encourage other Powers to intrigue with
the Sultan and not improbably lead the Sultan to look favourably on a commercial treaty with
Germany if such were proposed.
13. As regards (c), we have received information which shows a tendency on the part of
the arms runners to split up consignments and despatch them from time to time in small
quantities when any danger of their being intercepted is apprehended. This procedure, if
adopted to any greater extent, must raise the cost, and thereby depreciate considerably the
profits, of the trade.
Were the trade at Maskat checked, it is possible an attempt might be made to utilise
Koweit or Bahrein. Bahrein could be dealt with without difficulty, and as regards Koweit
we should presumably press again the recommendations made in our despatch of 21st February
19U7*. Neither of these ports offers, however.
No. 901 in Seorot E., May 1907, No.. 866.936. the same a(lvantage3 a3 Maskat, and the trade
in Koweit is not so dangerous from the point of view of our interests.
14. There is another p5int which may be urged in favour of the policy of a naval
blockade. Assuming that the blockade is established and is effective with the result that the
trade at Maskat receives a severe check, it may be possible to resume negotiations with
France with better hopes of success, for, so soon as our operations render trade unprofitable, the
trade cry which influences the French Government must lose most of its force. The French
merchants will lose the profits bought by the trade, while the French Government will not
have obtained the quid pro quo which we were prepared to give her in compensation therefor.
A possible objection is that a sudden increase to our Naval strength in the Gulf might be
misinterpreted. The validity of this objection will largely depend on the course which events
take in Persia, and it is difficult at this stage to know how much weight to attach to it, but
assuming that our intentions are published, such a consideration need not deter us from the
execution of a policy which our interests demand.
15. If it is admitted that an attempt must be made to suppress the arms [traffic by a
naval blockade, the first step should perhaps be to ascertain the approximate cost of the scheme
proposed by His Excellency the Naval Commacder-in-Chief, after Army Department has
been consulted.
L. W. Reynolds, —29-6-09.
Foreign Office Press —No. 396—29-6-09—20.