"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية: العمليات في بلاد فارس ١٩١٤-١٩١٩" [و‎‎١‎٧‎٣] (٥٦٦/٣٥٠)

301
MORE TROOPS FOR HAMADAN
against the unimportance that was apparently being attached
to the despatch of British troops into North-West Persia. He
pointed out that the political situation at Tehran hinged entirely
on the military action in North-West Persia which he had
informed the Persian Government we were about to take, and
that Vossuk-ud-Daula and our friends, who were already uneasy
at the delay, would be dismayed if they knew the real facts.
In another telegram of the same date Sir Charles Marling said
that two Persian Ministers had resigned and the fall of the
Cabinet seemed imminent. His own policy had been to aim
at delaying Vossuk-ud-Daula’s assumption of office until the
situation had changed with the arrival of our troops at Hamadan
and the approach of the new harvest. But Vossuk-ud-Daula
professed his readiness to take office at once with a strongly
Anglophile policy, though his demands in return, both as regards
concessions and financial assistance, as well as demands from
the Shah for a large personal allowance, were extravagant. As,
however, our troops had not arrived and Vossuk was almost
the only string to our bow, there was nothing for it but to give
money freely.
By this time H.M. Government recognised that they had
misunderstood the situation; and on the 18th May the War
Office telegraphed orders that General Dunsterville was to be
supported from Mesopotamia to the utmost extent of the avail
able transport. Again, on the 21st, learning from Tehran that
a prompt display of force might gain for us the active support
of the Persian Government, they instructed General Marshall
to make every effort to maintain a larger force than had been
previously intended—up to the strength of a cavalry regiment,,
an infantry brigade, armoured cars and aeroplanes—at Hama
dan and towards the Caspian. On the 24th General Marshall
replied that the movement of troops into Persia, which had
been delayed by the Kirkuk operations, would proceed; and
he hoped to have the maximum force he could maintain at
Hamadan by the middle of June.*
In the meantime Bicharakoff had expressed his desire to go
to the Caucasus before it was too late, and General Dunsterville
proposed to collect all the British troops in his vicinity and,
severing his connection with Persia to the south of Enzeli, to
accompany Bicharakoff. Sir Charles Marling, however, pro
tested strongly against Persia being denuded of British troops ;
and learning from other sources that the capture of Baku by
* There was considerable discussion over the force to be sent. For details
see “ Mesopotamia Campaign/' Volume IV.