"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية: العمليات في بلاد فارس ١٩١٤-١٩١٩" [ظ‎‎٢‎٢‎٥] (٥٦٦/٤٥٥)

400
OPERATIONS IN PERSIA
Trans-
Caspia ;
November
1918.
Bolsheviks to the extent he suggested and that they were not
prepared to approve the occupation of the Charjui bridge or the
retention of Merv by British or Indian troops. His difficulties
with the Trans-Caspian Government were realised, but they
should be made to understand that they must be prepared to
hold their own against the Bolsheviks by their own unaided
efforts and that he had not been authorised to give them more
assistance than that which he had originally been told to afford
them. His instructions not to advance eastward of Tejend
must, therefore, hold good and it was left to his discretion to
distribute and house his troops as he thought fit.
Other telegrams from General Malleson received at this
period showed that anti-Bolshevik risings seemed to be gaining
ground in Turkestan, that the Bolshevik force had retired to
Ravnina, 65 miles east of Merv, and that the Central Bolshevik
Government were organising a great effort to enlist all the
Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war to fight for them. With
regard to the last named report General Malleson suggested
that we should forestall the Bolsheviks by intimating to the
prisoners of war in Turkestan that we were prepared to repatriate
them as soon as the Baku-Batum route was open, provided they
laid down their arms and came over to us. This would greatly
simplify our task in Turkestan, but to ensure success would
have to be done at once. In reply, he was told that the question
had been referred to London, but that in the meantime he
could make all his arrangements for the necessary propaganda,
though he would have to be cautious, as considerable difficulties
would be involved in accommodating, feeding and transporting
large numbers.
On the 6th November the Government of India asked the
India Office for an early indication of H.M. Government's policy
in Trans-Caspia and also suggested that full weight should be
given to the disturbing effect, on the war party in Afghanistan,
of the presence of British troops at Merv and the rumours of
their future possible advance, at a time when fanatical feeling
over the Turkish armistice would be running high.
On the same day General Malleson sent a long telegram 0
India urging strongly that an early decision should be given
regarding our policy in Central Asia. The allied operations
against the Bolsheviks in North Russia, Siberia and Turkestan,
following the British declaration to the Russian P e0 P e ^
had, he said, been interpreted by everyone in Turkes an
as pledging the Allies to suppress Bolshevism so as to allow 0
Russian self-determination. If this was not the Allied inten 10 >