ملف ١٩١٥/٥٣ الجزء IV "الحرب الألمانية: تركيا؛ الخلافة إلخ" [و‎‎٢‎٣] (٤٨١/٤٢)

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we are to treat with aiiy one Arab prinoe about the future of the
Arab peoples, we are bound to prefer the Sherif. But, in the
actual default of general organization of those peoples, it
would be futile to treat with hi- alone and to assume that,
through him, we could influence and bind all the Arabs*
It is, therefore, not only legitimate but advantageous
that negotiations, on the same lines and based on the same
general principles as those conducted with the Sherif, should
go forward with other Arabian potentates such as the Emir of
Riadh and El Idrisi; or be initiated with others, such as the
Yemen. So long as Arab independence of the Turks, and
autonomous governments suitable to the several districts,
are the basal principles in such negotiations, they cannot
conflict with our engagements to the Sherif or be regarded
by him or others as detrimental to the Arab cause.
Although positive anti-Ottoman action on a considerable
scale has not yet been taken as a result of our negotiations
with the Shorif, it must be pointed out that their negative
result is wholly satisfactory. Through them, in a most
critical year of war, we have not only secured the benevolent
neutrality of a very powerful Moslem influence, but also
caused serious embarrassments to our enemy and deferred or
defeated the realization of large plans for arraying Moslem
hostility against us, which might have rendered our position
in the East far less favourable than it is today.
/