ملف ١٩١٥/٥٣ الجزء IV "الحرب الألمانية: تركيا؛ الخلافة إلخ" [ظ‎‎٢‎٢‎٩] (٤٨١/٤٥٥)

12
Meskene. Under these circumstances a large Turkish army might be built
up at Diarbekir, but its mobility would be much impeded and its ammunition
supply feeble.
The main objection to this course is that the Turks would have a better
position at a peace conference, since the attack of a large Turkish army
acting on the defensive with flanks secure would be a costly undertaking.
The initial steps in either case would possibly be as follows : —
1 st Step. Land Forces A., !>., C., 1)., in the Gulf of Alexandretta.
2 nd Step. Secure the exit of the Cilician Gates.
3rd Step. Land at Haifa Force E. and begin operations in North
Syria.
-Notes on above.
( 1 ) The population south of A intab* may be regarded as a negligeable
quantity.
(2) In North Mesopotamia the nomads and chieftains, both Kurd and
Arab; may be dealt with and subventioned ; the promise to them of the
plunder of Diarbekir, in retaliation for the Armenian massacres, would
probably bring them in on our side, provided we are successful.
(o) 11 \Dothetically the foeces for such an expedition should be provided
with ample horse transport, though the railways could be got into working
oidei within three months, with the exception of the Euphrates bridge at
Jerablus, which must be assumed to be destroyed.
(4) A strong proportion of cavalry is required with Forces “D ” “ E ”
and “ F.”
FI XA L 0 BS ERVATJON.
In conclusion it is perhas worth considering a certain psychological
nbosyncracies of Ottoman armies, which both present and past operations
appear to demonstrate as a permanent factor in warfare in which thev are
engaged lor some reason Ottoman armies appear to be formidable in a
cbrect offensive or m a direct defensive, but on the other hand seem to be
tee ole in manoeuvre, or in the face of mobile troops.
Thus Ottoman troops—
(0
( 2 )
(3)
(4)
(5)
( 6 )
w II hold an entrenched position the flanks of which are secure, in
lace of heavy losses.
M ill resist when surrounded beyond expectation.
M ill deliver unexpectedly strong attacks over open country on a
Known objective it the enemy assumes a passive defensive.
Are quickly disorganised by an unexpected development in the open,
^ and to fail accommodate themselves to a new situation
frequently fail in operations necessitating combined manoeuvres.
Aie bad at partizan or mountain warfare.
As examples of the first may be cited—
Omar Pasha s operations on the Danube, 1852
The battle of the Shipka pass, 1877.
The holding of the Chatalja lines, 1912.
The Dardanelles operations, 1915.
As examples of the second—
Kars, 1852-53.
Kars—Erzerum— Plevna, 1877-78.
Adrianople, 1912.
As examples of the third—
The campaign in Thessalay, 1897.
The Italian campaign in Tripoli, 1911.
The battle of Shaiba, 1915.
The attack on the Suez Canal, 1914.
As examples of the fourth—
The battle of Nezib, 1840 (?).
The battle of Kirk Kilisse, 1912.
Ihe battles of Nasirie, Amara, and Kut, 1915.