ملف ١٩١٥/٥٣ الجزء IV "الحرب الألمانية: تركيا؛ الخلافة إلخ" [ظ‎‎٢‎٣‎١] (٤٨١/٤٥٩)

the population and monuments of the city, and avoid the inevitable losses
which the Allies would sustain in the final operations between the Narrows
and the Bosphorus.
Under such circumstances His Highness said that the cession of Gallipoli
to the Allies would be included in terms of peace similar to those already-
mentioned. Finally, His Highness said that in event of the Allies not approving
such a course, his party would hold their hand until Constantinople had
actually fallen, when the revolutionary action would be easy. Under such
circumstances the new Government would be able to treat with the Allies on
the same terms, the Constantinople clause being eliminated from the discussion
owing to its having been lost by the present Ottoman Government. His
Highness does not impress one as being a man likely to carry through a
great political move such as the first and second courses he mentioned would
entail ; however, it is quite possible that no great abilities would be wanted
in the third case.
His attitude with regard to the Caliphate was that his party desired
the severance of religion from affairs of State, and that the possession
of the Caliphate engendered ihe ill-will both of France and England,
and that the transfer of the office would enable the Ottoman Government
to legislate on a basis of religious equality in Turkey more easily when the
Sultan was no longer a religious emblem.
I asked His Highness to whom he would expect the office would be
transferred, and he replied at once the “ Sherif of Mecca.” I then asked
His Highness whether it was not necessary that the Caliph should be an
independent Prince, and he replied that his party would be quite ready to
recognise the independence of the Sherif in Mecca and Medina. This was
substantially all that Prince Sabah-ed-Din said with regard to the situation
in Turkey, though he insisted at great length on the evils of Russia having
possession of Constantinople, and 1 could see that his real object was to
prevent this taking place. 1 will inform Captain Deeds of Prince Sabah-ed-
Din’s views at the first opportunity, and he will be able to give an opinion
as to what practical influence they may have in Turkey, and what actual
power 1 Vince Sabah-ed-Din’s party has.
1 have, Ac.,
No. 14 (Secret'. Shepherds Hotel, Cairo,
^ r > 14th July 1915.
1 have the honour in the following despatch to give a summary of the
views of the various persons whom 1 have seen in Cairo who are repre
sentative of various shades of Syrian, Arabian, Armenian, and Moslem
opinion, and 1 venture to include herein an appreciation of certain phases
of the situation as they may lie seen from this angle.
I he Sultan. —Sir Henry MacMahon considered it advisable enough to
introduce me to His Highness, and it happened that 1 saw him very soon
nftei the late attempt upon his life. His bearing showed extreme courage
and contempt of death, but at the same time it was not difficult to
distinguish the grief which the outrage caused him in view of Ids devotion
to his people.
In the course of conversation His Highness expressed his conviction that
Syiia.should form a part of the Egyptian Government. 1 think that this
view is not the result of any personal ambition, but a natural desire on the
pai t of a descendant of Mohammed All to restore once more the kingdom as
the genius of the founder of his house conceived it. Moreover, it is a patent
hu t ihat the position of His Highness is weak because his position as Sultan
has no moial sanction of any kind in the eyes of Moslems. This is a
mattei m which personal popularity and goodness of character can play
no part.
At present His Highness bears a title the Caliph alone can confer, yet
has received his office at the hands of a Christian power. Had he been
appointed by the assembly, or even invited to assume the position by a body
of leligiously learned persons, he would have some claim on the allegiance