"ملف ١١/٢ يوميّات وتقارير: سلسلة الجزيرة العربية" [ظ‎‎٤‎٧] (٢٢٢/٩٤)

51
((/) The A nva hicident led to a fresh meeting of delegations. As you aro
aware tue\ r came to a deadlock over territorial questions and tlie Imam lett tue
matter to the arbitration of Ibn Sand. The King’s telegram of the 22nd Kajab,
loot) (the bra December, 1951), giving Ins awara, is precise only in the phrase :
“ 1 say that 1 abandon Jebel Arwa to your Honour.” It is, however, clear
from the corresp(>ndnce that other specilic areas had been discussed, including
that of the Deni Malik and Jebel Pita, and the Imam, in his reply of tne 27th
Kajab, 1350 (the 8 th December, 1931), said that he had instructed his delegates
not to pursue the question of that particular area. This goes iar to justify
Ibn fraud’s resentment at the Imam's recent interference in the area in ques
tion, but the correspondence is in other respects ambiguous. Tne editor of
the Green Hook seems hardly justified in stating that the Imam’s teiegiam
constitutes a complete recognition of the frontier by the Imam, subject only to
a request of consideration of a proposal of his in regard to two named t ribps.
From a European point of view the upshot of the Arwa dispute can only be re
garded as obscure, except as regards Arwa itself and perhaps the Beni Malik-
Fifa area.
(e) Immediately after the settlement of the Arwa question, the delegates,
signed a Treaty of Friendship, &c., dated the 15th December, 1931. It was noted
at the time that this treaty made no reference to frontiers. It has always been
doubtful whether tire Imam regarded it as a treaty at all, although the fraud!
Government stated later that it had been ratified by an exchange of telegrams.
(t now appears from the texts of these as published in the Green Book that Ibn
fraud's telegram expressed a straightforward approval of what his delegates
had agreed to, but the Imam’s telegram could be read either as an approval or
as a postponement pending further discussion. On the face of it, it looks like ^
an approval, but he asked the King to send his delegates again to discuss, out
standing minor points.
6 . Chapters VI to XIII relate to the most recent phase beginning about
the end of August 1932, when, after delay due to various causes, including the.
ILn Rifada revolt, the King again turned his attention seriously to his rela
tions with the Imam. I have not had the whole of these chapters translated, as
you are familiar with the main course of events and the result of all the nego
tiations, including the King’s suggestion for a sort of alliance, has h en
negatived so far as any agreements of permanent effect are concerned.
7. I have not yet had time to study Chapter XIV, which deals with the
Yam and with Najran. The divergence of views regarding these has been so
complete and both parties are, to my mind, on such weak ground that I do not
expect the documents to prove of much use either way, but, if I find them to be
of sufficient interest. I will submit a further report on them at leisure.
8 . The Imam Yahya is a master of obscure language. Ibn fraud is more
capable of precision, but can be equally obscure on occasion. They both, as you ^
know 7 , overlay most of wiiat thev sav with blankets of pious verbiage. I trust,
therefore, that you will make allowance for the imperfection of this despatch,
which I have prepared at a time of great pressure from rough translations of
highly peculiar texts. T have endeavoured to isolate the points which seem to
have most bearing on the present dispute, in case the recent happy turn of events
should result in a rational general settlement free from the ambiguities of the
past.
9 . In this connexion I would revert to my despatch No. 1 of the 2nd January
relative to the possibility of a Saudi claim to Hudevda and connected matters.
In that despatch I expressed the view that a study of historical events since 1872"
might be a useful contribution to an examination of the claims and counter-claims
of the two rulers. I have found that to be really useful such a study should go
much further back, and, while I have collected a good deal of material, T have
found it unite impossible to complete and collate it. The most I can hope to do
is to nroduce at some future time a paper of some historical interest, even
though a settlement between Ibn fraud and the Imam should deprive it of
practical utility.
10. In the meanwhile the facts which T have collected are of use in shaping
mv owti views. If I were revising mv despatch No. 1 of 2nd January, I should
amend it in various particulars. T should not, however, alter my virnv that
Tbn fraud has a good case for claiming both ports of Aeir : that he w r ould have a
verv poor ease for claiming as against the Imam, on historical or le°al grounds,
the littoral beyond a point somewdiere not far south of the Wadi Tashar ; and