"ملف XXXVIII/٥ تقرير عن صور بقلم الرائد ج. ب. ميرفي.، المساعد الهندي، الوكيل السياسي، مسقط. ١٠-١٠-١٩٢٨". [و‎‎١‎٤‎٢] (٣٠٨/٢٩٤)

case most of the trade from the interior would be
deviated to Sur and the revenues and trade of Muscat
would become negligible.
In 1895,the British Government extended to Saiyid
Faisal the guarantee given to his Father that tney
would not allow attacks to be made upon Muscat and
Mat rah whatever differences the Sultan might, nave with
his tribes,
In actual practice,this guarantee was extended to
u.11 the ports of the Batinah coast and th Kuryat at
which British subjects were residing and in 1896,an
offer was made by the British Government and finally
accepted by the Sultan of naval assistance ^he V
recovery of Bhofar.
If assistance is to be afforded,the question
arises as to what form such assistance shall take
and I venture to put forward the following remarks
on the question.
It seems hardly lively that at the stage ” Tillch
has now been reached,Mahomed hin Naser would he devi-
-ated from his purpose hy moral pressure alone. His
attitude will probably be that of the Jenebeh in 1865.
"We have been threatened before. Nothing has happened.
We are quite sure nothing will happen now.*
It was suggested last year that economic pressure
could be brought on the inhabitants of Sur by preve*
nting Sheir dhows from trading in British ports.
This was the policy attempted by Napoleon against
England. It failed then; 1 doubt whether it would
succeed in the present instance.
Naval action has been taken at Sur before as has
been noted in the Historical Summary of the Jenebeh
The presence of a man of war would appear to have a
g ood moral effect at the time but its influence seems
to depatt as soon as it has steamed aut of sight.and