مجموعة ٢٨\ ٨٥ "بلاد فارس. العلاقات مع شركة النفط الأنجلو-فارسية التابعة للحكومة البريطانية." [ظ‎‎٤] (٣٨٠/٨)

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(a) The Conrpany^ takings under the concession are said to be
rising, so that before the war in Europe is over, the
annual sum due to the Persian Government under the
concession may total more than 000,000. Hence the
agreement should not impose an undue burden on the
Company.
(b) When the matter was first considered in February last,
it was pointed out that the Persians already 'had more
sterling than they knew what to do with; so that further
payments in sterling would be no real gain to them.
xhe view now taken is that the only way to stave off the
financial crisis which threatens Persia is to supply
her with more money - in any currency which will
provide backing for her note issue - in spite of the
risks of inflation jwhich this involves. In fact the
Persian Government have just asked for and obtained
from the Company an advance on the 1943-19A4 royalties
in order to keep their head above water.
Financial Secretary to see.
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Xe . vii. 4 3 _
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Seen, thanks.
I am rather doubtful whether this really serves a useful
monetary purpose. It is true that there is a considerable degree
of inflation in Persia and further exacerbation of the condition is
probably inevitable as we and our Allies have to pour out money in
connection with military needs. Such additions to the circulation
may well require to be backed by sterling or some other acceptable
form of backing; but the amounts of sterling involved in the
"make-up” payments are presumably held freely in the hands of the
Persian authorities,enabling them to pour out further currency on
their own account (which they dphot have the trouble of raising by
taxation or borrowing and thus exerting a counter-inflationary effect)
in addition to the unavoidable outpouring by us for our military
needs.
22.vii.1943.
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