ملف ١٩١٦/٣٨٣٩ جزء ١ "بلاد فارس: - مقدار النفقات - مسألة مراجعة اتفاقية سنة ١٩٠٠" [ظ‎‎٣‎٢‎٣] (٨٨٠/٦٥٩)

to which we had already agreed, nor do we wish to discuss here any item of minof
import. There are, however, some items in regard to which we feel strongly that
we ought to be relieved of all liability. These are the payments on account of the
Cossack Division (No. 3) ; the payment to Soulet-ed-Dowleh (No. 13); the subsidy
to the Shah (No. 14) ; the payment to Vossuk-ed~Dowleh (No. 16 (6)J ; the special
expenditure in connection with the loan of 1920 (No. 19) ; and the payment on
account of the South Persia Rifles (No. 20). It will be observed that some of these
payments extended beyond 1918-19 and they could not therefore even be described
as made in furtherance of the objects connected with the war. The heavy pay
ments made on account of Persia have more than once formed the subject of adverse
criticism in India, and we should find the greatest difficulty even in pretending to
justify the particular expenditure to which we have referred, were it made the
subject of detailed interpellation by the Legislature.
5. In the second place, we think that the figures we have quoted illustrate the
grave danger to our finances involved in an understanding that expenditure of
any particular type shall be divided on any rule of proportions. It is clear that
when an emergency arises, such understanding affords an argument for extending
the principle of division into a sphere not contemplated by the original agreement,
It is as a consequence of the existence of an agreement of this nature that we have
in the past years been debited with large sums, sometimes in furtherance of a policy
to which we were definitely opposed, and on other occasions without even being
allowed an opportunity of expressing an opinion on the expenditure, We shall
return subsequently to the system which we now propose should be followed in
regulating the division of expenditure as between the Indian and the Imperial Ex
chequers. But we desire to make one preliminary remark. It is useless to devise
any new formula of distribution, unless we can obtain some guarantee that the latter
will be strictly interpreted, and that, wherever it is found necessary to go beyond
a strict interpretation, the previous consent of the Government of India is obtain
ed. Political expenditure is not subject to the vote of the Legislature, but it is,
in practice, open to interpellation and discussion, and you will, we trust, concede’
that it is unreasonable to ask us to justify to the Assembly expenditure about the
propriety of which we have not been convinced or even consulted. We do not
overlook the statutory powers of the Secretary of State in Council in regard to
expenditure from the revenues of India, but we are convinced that it will not be
possible to place expenditure of this nature (which is not strictly concerned with
the governance of India itself) on a satisfactory basis, until it is definitely agreed that
no fresh expenditure on Persia, and in particular no expenditure that goes beyond
the strictest definition of Diplomatic and Consular expenditure—the upkeep of the
legation and consulates and the usual contingent expenditure thereon—shall be
debited against India without the previous and express assent of the Government
of India.
6 . W e turn now to consider the present extent of India’s interests in Persia in
order to arrive at a decision as to the principle on which expenditure should in
future be divided between India and the Imperial Exchequer. Indian and Imperial
interests in Persia were in their inception common, centring, as they did, in the
defence of India, first against France, then against Afghanistan, and more
lately against Russia. So long as the interests remained common it was natural
that the expenditure should be shared in moieties, and this was the incidence re
commended by the Wei by Commission. But in the laborious process of consolidat
ing those common interests there have grown up other interests, important and