ملف ١٩١٦/٣٨٣٩ جزء ١ "بلاد فارس: - مقدار النفقات - مسألة مراجعة اتفاقية سنة ١٩٠٠" [ظ‎‎٣‎٣‎٨] (٨٨٠/٦٨٩)

rlar^P therefore to delay evacuatjou of women and children at any rate until the
early Summer then if it proves (? word omitted) it should take the form of a gradual
exodus to Ispahan and Shiraz, but in co-operation with-hakhtians. I am aware that
here the main difficulty lies in the question of transport, but it, seems quite possible
that mule transport can be collected at Ispahan, and a conyoy of vans be sent up
from Bushire via Shiraz, on which route they would have the protection of the- South
Persian Pifles. Meanwhile, we should rally our adherents at the capital amongst
moderate Nationalists and non-Bolshevik elements, who are convinced that the
country can only be saved from anarchy with our help. W e should devise another
agreement which the Majlis will accept, and on basis oi which 1 is Majesty s Govern
ment will continue to help Persia. It is quite possible that such an agreement may
involve our acquiescence in a change of Shah or change ol uynasty, and L do not
think that we should hesitate in giving it. In any case, attitude of Bakhtiaris will
be an important factor, and 1 do not at all agree with the view expressed by His 1
Majesty’s Minister that they are essentially unfriendly. On the contrary, ! believe
they are fully alive to advantages of friendly relations with us, and provided their
interests are safeguarded and promoted, the majority of them could be got to
participate with us in any scheme for the saving of Persia from chaos.
Supposing that it is decided that (? word omitted) has gone too far to admit of
the adoption ol the above policy, or if it is tried and fails, then 1 think we must nniKC
up our minds to let Northern Persia go Bolshevik if it wishes to; but in that case,
provided again that we are prepared to spend some money, I see no reason why we
should not hope to maintain our interests and effective influence in the sphere in
Avhich they mainly exist, and which I should include by a line passing froin the
Persian frontier near Khanikin, through Kennanshah, Khurumabad, Ispahan, Yezd,
Kerman, and so on, and 1 think our policy should be to stabilise situation in that
In fact, it seems to me impossible that we can do otherwise than endeavour to
area.
ensure safety of our numerous and vital oil interests in this part of Persia, namely,
near Qa'sr-i-’Shirin, in Pushtikuh, in Arabistan, and in Bakhtiari country. Maintenance
of close relations wixh Bakhtiaris is essential both parties, and we must remember
that Ispahan, Yezd and Kerman are now in the hands of Bakhtiari Governors. In
the event of a collapse of the Government at Teheran, and the flight of the Shah, I
think we should (? allow' the) Wall of Pushtikuh, the Sheikh of Mohammerah, and the
Bakhtiaris to ^declare their independence, or their separation from Government of
Teheran, and should encourage them to make a three-cornered pact among themselves
to stand together to maintain their own interests and resist Bolshevik aggression.
We should probably (? do omitted) well to have Kashgais (corrupt group) in too.
All four elements are mainly tribal and already practically independent. They would
only need a hint to induce turbulent tribes to take action, but for us it would be
important that they should act together. Such a confederation wmuld offer a very
formidable buhvark to Bolshevik aggression, as w r ell as protection of our own material
and legitimate interests in Persia. If this line of policy be* favourably entertained, it
seems to me that we shoi® do all that is possible to expedite improvement of
communications from south Tutw ards, namely, from Khanikin to Kermanshah, from
Mohammerah to Khurumabaa, and roads from Ahwaz, Bushire and Bandar Abbas.
I avou Id venture to suggest that, if the above suggestions are considered to
provide basis for any constructive line of policy, representatives of all the chief
British firms with commercial stakes in Persia should be called together for discussion
of the subject, in order that it may lie known what amount of co-operation may be
expected from them.