مجموعة ٢٨ /٦٧ "بلاد فارس: تقارير سنوية، ١٩٣٢-" [ظ‎‎٢‎٩‎٧] (٦٤٤/٥٩٤)

16
in post-war conditions. As long as the present Shah remained on the throng
the army would play a preponderant role m the country s aftairs and rema
the chief instrument of internal security For the Americans to concentrate on
the gendarmerie and police would be all very well if they obtained an increasing
share of the revenue at the expense of the army; the continued presence o
General Ridley’s Mission would not entirely solve this problem but would at
least limit it sufficiently to give Colonel Schwartzkopf a fair chance. Hi^
Maiesty’s Government thereupon urged the United States Government to let
Colonel Schwartzkopf have additional staff so as to enable him to take over the
police, but as regards General Ridley they confined themselves to as ang w ic er,
in the event of his task not being completed by that date, the War Departmen
would let him stay on until he had finished. The State Department replied that
the War Department did not hold out much hope of keeping General Ridley pn
beyond March 1945 unless he himself recommended it. They succeeded m
persuading the War Department of the importance of improving the police, but
did not feel justified in proposing the matter to the Persian Government. The
latter either'of their own accord, or at British prompting must make a definite
request that Colonel Schwartzkopf should take over the police. His Majesty s
Government instructed this embassy to impress upon the Persian Government
the importance of acting quickly in the matter. Approaches to the
Persian Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, however, produced no result,
probably because of the known hostility of the Russians to the presence of
American advisers in Persia, and the opposition to Dr Millspaugh m the Majlis
which was becoming more and more violent and tended to prejudice toe question
of the employment of American advisers in general.
(b) Dr. Millspaugh’s Mission.
64. From April onwards there was a campaign against Dr. Millspaugh
and his colleagues both in the Majlis and in the press. The more important
criticisms were ;—
(1) That the mission had not reorganised the finances nor prevented a rise
in prices nor assured supplies. „ . . . . .
(This charge is in many ways unfair. Dr. Millspaugh did his best during
a period of inflation to increase revenue and reduce expenditure but was faced,
through no fault of his own with a considerable deficit on the previous year s
working. It is perhaps true, however, that his attempt to impose a much higher
income-tax than before was unsound psychologically. Even in more civilised
and less corrupt countries it usually takes a number of years before people can
be persuaded to pay income-tax honestly and before an administrative cadre
can be developed that will ensure collection. Dr. Millspaugh’s income-tax has
therefore been a failure, but the Persians, whose fault it is, are the last people
who are entitled to criticise him for it. Again, the rise in prices is largely due
to the presence of the Allied forces in this country and it is unlikely that the
price level will fall until they are withdrawn or until the end of the war with
Germany is in sight; Dr. Millspaugh’s measures were probably responsible for a
marked slackening in the rate of increase of the price level. On the other hand
there is more substance in the third part of the charge, that supplies have not
been assured. Although large quantities of commodities such as piece goods,
tea sugar and drugs are in the country and under Government control, they
do not for most part reach the consumer at reasonable prices. Here again
Dr. Millspaugh was defeated by the dishonesty of the average Persian; you
cannot distribute goods far and wide through the land when you cannot trust
anybody to distribute them honestly. In so far as country districts have received
rationed supplies at all it is mainly due to personal supervision by the local
American officials.) .
(2) That the expenditure of Persian Government money on the administra
tion of the Supply Department, the Price Stabilisation Section and Road
Transport organisation was excessive.
(The pay of the American personnel in these departments is very high by
Persian standards, but their work is essential to Persian economy and the
expenditure is consequently justified.)
(3) That some of the members of the mission were incompetent.
(This is true to some extent but it is due (a) to the difficulty of securing
p-ood men in war time, and (b) to the inexperience of Americans in the field of
adviser to foreign Governments. Nevertheless at least a dozen of the Millspaugh
Mission are capable men. As regards Dr. Millspaugh himself, his qualities