مجموعة ٦ / ٤ (١) "عسير: تولي ابن سعود السيطرة على الإدارة الداخلية لعسير". [ظ‎‎٧‎٧] (١١٠٤/١٦١)

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7. Sheikh Hafiz Wahba was informed, in reply to his enquiry as to the
attitude of His Majesty’s Government that it did not appear possible for them
to give King Ibn Sand any material support which would be of use to him, with
out themselves becoming involved in hostilities with the Imam, which (as the
Minister himself recognised) was out of the question. Moreover, if King Ibn
Baud desired His Majesty s Government to exercise then influence with the
Italian Government to induce them to observe an attitude of neutrality, it wa '
dear that His Majesty’s Government must themselves remain strictly neutral.
8 . Throughout the interview every opportunity was taken to urge counsels
of moderation upon the Minister. It was also suggested to him that an incursion
by the Idrisi into Asir, even supported by Yemeni troops, could well be treated
bv King Ibn Baud as a rebellion in his own territory and thus as an internal
matter,'and that actual hostilities with the Imam might by this means be avoided.
9. 5 At the conclusion of the interview, Sheikh Hafiz Wahba was assured
that, while the situation seemed too hypothetical to make it possible for His
Majesty’s Government to make any definite pronouncement as to their attitude,
the whole question would be most carefully considered and instructions would be
sent to you as soon as possible regarding the reply which you should make to the
Emir Feisal’s memorandum and to Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman's representations.
Subsequently, I addressed to His Majesty’s Ambassador at Rome my telegram
No. 181 of 1 the 24th July, which was repeated to you under No . 93 , and
. . *1 , , i n i • /'■'i _ _ J *
instructions as to your reply to the Saudi Government were embodied in my
.4^7? telegram No. 94 of the 26th July.
10. On the 25th July, the Saudi Arabian Minister again called at this
Department. He said that he had reported to King Ibn Saud by telegram the
result of his previous interview, and had now received a reply from His Majesty,
disclaiming any intention of taking aggressive action against the Imam and
containing instructions to convey to me the following supplementary information.
11 . As His Majesty’s Government w^ere aware, an agreement had been
reached between King Ibn Saud and the Imam in the winter of 1931-32 regarding |
their common frontier, under which His Majesty had abandoned to the Imam |
the Jebel Arwa and all the territory to the south of it, retaining the area known
as Nejran and all the territory to the north of it in Saudi Arabia. Somewhat
later, a further Saudi mission had been sent to the Yemen to negotiate a general
treaty settlement. The Imam, on an unconvincing plea of illness, had kept the
mission waiting for thirty-five days without receiving it. Meanwhile, the Asir
rebellion had broken out, and the Imam began a gradual occupation of Nejran.
This Saudi mission had achieved nothing; but, after the suppression of the Asir
rebellion, King Ibn Saud had agreed with the Imam to pardon the rebel leaders
and to allow the Idrisi to remain as a refugee in the northern Yemen on the
condition that the Imam undertook to prevent his intriguing against Saudi
Arabia. A third Saudi mission had then been sent to the Yemen to try to reach
a general settlement. It was then that the Imam put forward a demand for
“ all the Idrisi’s dominions.” This claim was no doubt purposely vague, but
King Ibn Saud interpreted it as a demand for the whole of Asir.
12 . There were now two danger points. The first was in the coastal area,
where the Idrisi was collecting supporters in Yemeni territory, whence he might
at any moment make an incursion into Asir; Sheikh Hafiz Wahba did not, how
ever, seem to regard this danger as seriouslv as on the previous occasion. The
other danger-point was inland in Nejran; the greater part of Nejran was now
occupied by the Imam’s forces.
13. King Ibn Saud regarded Nejran as having been definitely allotted to
Saudi Arabia by the frontier arrangement of 1931-32, even though this arrange
ment was not a formal treatv. He was now receiving appeals from the people of
Nejran, who were suffering from the Yemeni occupation and definitely objected to
Zeidi rule. King Ibn Saud could not ignore these appeals, and, unless he took
action, Yemeni aggression was likely to continue He therefore felt that he must
“ defend ” Nejran and turn out the Yemeni troops. It was preparatory to taking
such action that he desired to know the views and attitude of His Majesty’s
Government.
14. This latest information communicated by the Saudi Minister appears
to put the matter in a somewhat new light. The frontier arrangement of 1931-32
^ was apparently a vague one. and it is not clear, either from the information
supplied by Sheikh Hafiz Wahba or from that given to Sir Andrew Ryan by Fuad