"ملخص لمراسلات، إلخ، تتعلق بشؤون آسيا الوسطى، بلوشستان، بلاد فارس، إلخ، ١٨٧٥-١٨٧٧. مع ملاحق." [و‎‎٧‎١] (٥٦٢/١٤٦)

and Russian Governments, on Central Asian affairs, does not encourag-e us to believe that a
protest, even if well grounded, would be in the least degree efficacious.
“ Another course would be a prompt and plain announcement to the Cabinet of St.
Petersburgh. that Her Majesty's Government cannot any longer regard the boundary of the
Russian Empire in Central Asia as naturally transitional, with an inherent right of indefinite
expansion, and that England will regard the next step in advance as a casus belli.
11 The definition and declaration of a casus belli are functions of sovereignty clearly
beyond the province of the Government of India; and as regards the adoption of this course,
we only observe that, unless it were accompanied by strong material guarantees for enforcing
it, or some simultaneous military movement, it would not, in our opinion, be likely to lead to
any practical result more satisfactory than that which may be anticipated from the mere pi’o-
test we deprecate, viz., soothing assurances certain to be broken on the first convenient oppor
tunity : whilst if it failed to elicit such assurances, it would involve the English Government
in a great war for a cause which uninstructed English opinion would probably regard as a
small one. But, as Her Majesty's Government has already reserved to itself full liberty for
the action which would at once become necessary if Russia rejected its definition of the casus,
we can see no reason why such action should not immediately be taken, without expressly
assigning to it any character which Russia could legitimately complain of, or openly oppose, as
hostile to herself; and the sooner action is taken the more efficacious it is likely to be.
“Were our relations with Afghanistan on a more satisfactory footing, the most natural
and most efficient form which such action could assume would be arrangements with the
Ameer, authorising him to enter into friendly relations with the Tekke Turkomans, and pro
mising him our support in protecting them from Russian aggression if they choose to
come under his rule. The Merv Tekkes have, for some time past, courted the Afghan alli
ance, guided by a firm belief in the dependence of the latter country on England, which
causes them to rely much on the aid they may obtain from it. But, unfortunately, it is
now too late to think of this line of action. Your Lordship, in your despatch to us.
No. 34 of the 19th of November 1875, pointed out that, ‘if ever the Russians should
accomplish the permanent occupation of Merv, the time would possibly have passed by,
when representations to the Ameer could be made with any useful result.' The truth of
that prediction is no longer susceptible of doubt. But the steps taken by us, in accordance
with Your Lordship's reiterated instructions, to effect by negotiation an amicable arrangement
with the Ameer of Cabul for the establishment of British agents at Candahar and Herat,
have failed; and it is now certain that, at the date of Your Lordship's despatch, the influence
of this Government at Cabul was even feebler than Your Lordship then supposed it to be.
So feeble is that influence at this moment that, during the reign of the present Ameer it
will probably be impossible for the Government of India to effect, by diplomatic means alone,
the object of the instructions addressed to us by Your Lordship in 1875; and, if it be still
possible either to prevent, or to counteract, the speedy results we anticipate from the occu
pation of Kizil Arvat, and the collection of military stores and transport at Charjui, by the
Russian forces in Central Asia, it can only be by some means wholly independent of the
co-operation, and wholly regardless of the resistance, of Shere Ali.
“ We need not now trouble Your Lordship with an exposition of all the evidence which
justifies this conviction; but we solicit attention to the following remarkable prediction by
Lord Lawrence, who, in the Minute we have already quoted, thus strongly expressed his
appreciation of the value of Afghanistan as a barrier State. ‘ I feel,' said His Lordship, ‘ no
shadow of a doubt that if, a formidable invasion of India from the west were imminent, the
Afghans, en masse, from the Ameer of the day to the domestic slave of the household, would
readily join it.' The possibility of this event Lord Lawrence contemplated without anxiety
believing that ‘all such hordes, however hardy, however resolute, however bent on plunder,
could make no real impression on the drilled and iron ranks we could oppose to them on the
plains of the Punjab and India.' We have already pointed out that an invasion of India
is not the danger which now calls for immediate precautionary action : but it must be evident
to Your Lordship that, if India ever is invaded, it will be by forces, and under conditions
essentially and formidably different from those to which Lord Lawrence limited his calcula
tions. Meanwhile the emphatic terms in which that Indian Statesman expressed his opinion of
the worthlessness of any frontier policy based on the anticipation of Afghan support, or even
Afghan neutrality, in a moment of serious danger, or embarrassment, to the British power
in India have been amply justified by subsequent experience, and are significantly, re-echoed in
th e subjoined extract from a recent report by one of our most experienced Native Agents :—
‘There is no gainsaying this, that, if the present mode of friendship, and occasionally
helping the Afghan Government with arms and money, is continued for another century, and
a desire is then expressed of any advances of interests in that country, the fruit of a hundred
years' friendship and friendly offices will be nothing more than what it has now shown itself
to be, i. e., the preparation of jehad and religious war.
“Next to Afghanistan, the country best situated for helping the Tekke Turkomans against
Russia and to which they most naturally look for assistance, is Persia. ‘ But here we are met
with the difficulty of not knowing whether the relations between Her Majesty's Government
and the Shah are such as to hold out any hopes of enlisting the services of the latter in prompt
and practical efforts to stem the progress of Russia. When Persia once before enquired if
the British Government would support her in a protest against the Russian occupation of Karee