"ملخص لمراسلات، إلخ، تتعلق بشؤون آسيا الوسطى، بلوشستان، بلاد فارس، إلخ، ١٨٧٥-١٨٧٧. مع ملاحق." [ظ‎‎٢‎٢‎٨] (٥٦٢/٤٦١)

[ xcviii ]
137. My colleagues may possibly be interested to learn that a few weeks ago Malcolm
Khan, the Persian Envoy in London, commenting on our present proceedings in Khelat,
informed Lord Derby that he was instructed to remind the British Government that Persia
has claims upon that Khanate, which are incompatible either with the annexation of it by
us, or anv interference on our part in its internal affairs. To this communication the British
Government has replied that we have no intention of annexing Khelat, but that we have, by
Treaty, rights of interference in the internal affairs of that Khanate, which we intend to
exercise in any way and to any extent deemed necessary by us for the protection of
British interests.
138. Now, it must be admitted that the conclusion of the Persian Government is not
altogether illogical, if it assumes that the policy, whereby we have apparently, with the best
intentions, rather hastened the disintegration of administrative unity and sovereign authority
in Khelat, ’ has been pursued as a deliberate preliminary to the anexation of the Khanate.
But this 'renewal of Persia’s claims on Khelat, which the settlement of the boundary in 1871
was deliberately intended to set at rest for ever, has, in my eyes, a sinister significance.
Persia has, of course, a direct interest in the settlement of the Kohuk question. This question
I have purposely hung up for the present, in accordance with the principle to which I am
anxious to conform the whole of my foreign policy. I consider that, in our present very
critical situation, nothing can be more mischievous than to treat such questions as if they
stood alone, or to decide them, from a judicial point of view, upon their own merits. Every
move ive now make in frontier affairs must be carefully considered beforehand in its proper
connection with the general principles of the game we are playing. For the geographical and
historical grounds on which the Kohuk question might be decided by a perfectly disinterested
tribunal, I care absolutely nothing; and, until I have clearly ascertained what decision of that
question will be most conducive to the security of British interests, 1 refrain from deciding
it. But this cannot be ascertained until the present character of our relations both with
Khelat and Afghanistan has assumed a more definite form. The impatience of the Persian
Government, however, in regard to the decision of the Kohuk question, has been manifested
on every possible occasion previous to the above-mentioned communication, and in this com
munication no reference is made to Kohuk. I am, therefore, of opinion that the language of
Malcolm Khan is not sufficiently explained by reference to Persian interests with regard to
Kohuk. There is reason to believe that Malcolm Khan is not absolutely incorruptible; he
is known to have accepted a large bribe in the “ Reuter concession” question, and he may not
probably differ from the rest of his colleagues in not being impervious to the influence of
Russian coin.
139. Russia has now at Teheran a Minister of restless energy, and apparently of consi
derable ability. The influence of the British Government at Teheran has, of late years, and
for obvious reasons, rapidly declined. That of the Russian Government has proportionately
increased.
The Russian Minister at Teheran, if he be at all in the confidence of his Government, is
probably conversant with the course oi the efforts made by General Kauffman to checkmate our
influence in Afghanistan, and he may reasonably be presumed to have apprehended a fact which
seems to have hitherto escaped the notice of my colleagues, that our hold over Khelat must
become a matter of vital importance to us, in proportion as our influence at Cabul declines.
There is, therefore, reason to suspect that the communication made to the British Government
by Malcolm Khan, on behalf of his own Government, may have been inspired by Russian
statesmanship; and that it represents the first movement of a pawn on the chessboard, by the
hand of our great and astute adversary.
140. Be that as it may, having regard to possible contingencies in Turkistan and
Northern Persia, our frontier relations in Khelat must now be conducted towards the attain
ment of objects of infinitely higher importance than the mere prevention of plunder within British
borders, or the safe transit of trade. We cannot, consistently with our own interest, allow the
Khanate to remain in its present distracted condition; the measures, hitherto adopted by us,
are not calculated to secure a permanent amelioration of that condition ; they have increased,
instead of lessening, the difficulties of the Khan. The direct payment of a subsidy to the
marauding tribes, mainly responsible for the late disturbances on our border, may, for the
moment, secure peace in British territory, but is in no way conducive to the permanent tran
quillity of Khelat. To subsidise habitual marauders, in order to relieve British territory from
their incursions, and, at the same time, to deprive the Khan of the only means ever possessed
by him (insufficient though they were) of preserving his own country from the raids of those
marauders, to give to the marauders large sums of money from the north, leaving them free
to devastate the south, is a policy which appears to me fraught with disastrous consequences.
141. Having laid down these general principles, I now come to the consideration of the
steps to be immediately taken in accordance with them.
Before deciding anything, we must await the receipt of Major Sandemau’s promised
report. Should that report convince me that he has, in any wise, pledged the Supreme
Government to a degree of support, which I am not prepared to accord to the Sirdars o
Khelat in their quarrel with the Khan, I shall reluctantly deem it my duty to place the