"ملف ٢٠/٨: شؤون دولة مسقط: احتجاج العمانيين" [ظ‎‎٧] (٦٣٤/١٤)

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except, perhaps, with the extreme puritanical party. The feeling against -he
British is due to their support of the Sultan and they hate the Sultan rather
than the British.
The meeting held by Lieutenant-Colonel Benn and Shaikh Isa in 1915
forms a useful basis to examine on what lines peace could be made, and I
would invite a reference to his letter No. 189, dated 28th September 1915.
In appendices C and D attached thereto will be found a comparative state
ment of the demands of the Sultan and the rebels and the answers thereto.
The answers of both sides are bombastic and unbending and would
continue to be so unless British influence were brought to bear.
The main stumbling block is the Wadi Semail and, notw ithstanding the
fact that Shaikh Isa stated that it was the Imam who would not give way on
this point, there is little doubt that it was Shaikh Isa himself who is the cause
of the difficulty. You will be aware of the importance of the Wadi Semail to .
Oman politics, it cuts Oman in two and is the key to the country and thus
must remain in the immediate possession of the Sultan.
The history of the country which I have given shows that, for the last
fifty years, the'Sultans of Oman have had little control over the interior except
at times over Nizwah and Izki, and unless Saiyid Taimur were very much
strengthened he could not hope to rule over Oman proper except by himself
living there among the tribes. (It is the fact that the Sultans of Oman
have left their proper place in the interior which has caused them to lose touch
with their tribes and so produced the feeling of hostility to them.)
The Sultan could not, however, for the moment, return to the interior and
it would, therefore, be necessary for him to nominate a Governor in his name.
There is no reason why Isa, w ho is an able man, should not be bribed by making
him that Governor. It w'ould at any rate be worth trying.
The chief stumbling block to peace is the existence of the Imam, but Isa
is the man behind the throne and should be able to evolve a system by which
the Imam could be given reljgious sway while he himself ruled in temporal
matters.
The suggestion of the Imam as the Sultan’s deputy was made and
negatived immediately, as w r as to he expected. The Sultans own opinion is
that as long as the Imam is alive he will be recognised by the tribes but a
discredited Imam with Isa detached would be a very different thing.
Former movements have all collapsed directly the el Harithi chief of the
moment was not in touch with them.
With reference to the details of appendices C and 1) of the letter above
referred to I think 1 have written enough to show that the claims of the
rebels to justice and better government are not without foundation and so
1 will not deal with such items which contain these demands; the replies of
the Sultan may, for a similar reason, be neglected.
The first demand in appendix C to be noted is No. 5. If Shaikh Isa or
some other person represented the Sultan this demand Would disappear.
Demand No. 6 for allowances might most distinctly be accommodated in
return for good behaviour.
Demand No. 7 refers to a trained corps. This would be explained to them
as being under British officers and a guarantee lor the good behaviour of ail
parties. •
Demand No, 9 refers to the slave trade and I am dealing with this in a
letter which I propose should be issued to the chiefs as mentioned later.
No. 10 release of prisoners would follow if meeting were not abortive.
No. 11 disputes to be settled by Muhammadan law is already agreed to.
No. 12 prohibition of sale of wine on tap should I think be agreed to.
No. 13 is already agreed to.
iSo. 14. would come under the new proposed ^arrangement of Customs.
1 now come to the demands of the bultan himself.