"ملف ٢٠/٨: شؤون دولة مسقط: احتجاج العمانيين" [و‎‎١‎٤‎٥] (٦٣٤/٢٨٩)

the need for decision. Paced with the necessity of saying
yes or no, I have every hope they will Bay yes. The leading
men desire pease, but it is typical of a theocracy that they
fear to act against a few fanaticaj' whom they themselves
have put in power. It 1 b strong action only that will
bring them to their sences.
In the event of an unfavourable reply
from Sheikh Isa, I venture to suggest the following course
of action which will be fully in accordance with our treaty
with the Sultan while it will coramit us in no way, cause
us no extra expence and involve us in no aggressive action.
It is only necessary for us to cease to
restrain the Sultan from acts of retaliation against the
Omanis. He will inevitably reimpose the full restrictions on
entering Muscat and Mattr?.h, forbid trading with the Omanis
and impose a prohibitive zakat. This will certainly cause
dislocation of trade and possibly loss to British merchants.
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On the other hand it will only be temporary,and 1$ theoretical
-ly fully within the Sultan’s power to take this action. If
tiiia is combined with revised custom arrangements and a
system of guarantees which I have propoesed elsewhere in
cases of export from India, tills will very rapidly bring
the Omanis to their reason.
It would be necessary to retain the
regiment at Mattrah for possibly six more months, and a
gun boat should be s stationed permanently at Muscat or the
vicinity.
I have suggested that the Sultan’s visit to India
be officially fixed for the beginning of February whether
an arrangement is arrived at with the Omanis or not. This
will not be without its effect.
I would urge again that in dealing with these
people, who are fanatical, ignorant and barbarous, we must
not permit shillyshallyinga • Should they not agree to the