"تقرير عسكري عن طهران وأقاليم شمال غرب بلاد فارس المجاورة لها (بما في ذلك المناطق المطلة على بحر قزوين)" [و‎‎٦‎٤] (٦١٠/١٣٢)

winter. They climb over the Elburz at a height of 1 9,000' to
12,000' by the most breakneck gradients and zigzags and
drop down ravines running parallel to each other from South to
North to the coast, and their extreme difficulty renders them of
little military importance as strategical lines of approach.
Briefly they embody all the features of the Kazvln-Manjil-
Rasht road on a far grander scale, the mountains are loftier and
more precipitous, the valleys narrower and deeper, the trees
bigger and the undergrowth denser.
Added to these are the further obstacles of severe gradients
and boulder strewn forest tracks, and deep snow in the highlands
which closes many of them from December to March.
The defiles are dominated by cliffs of 2,000' to 4,000' in
height and afford a series of positions where a single well placed
machine gun could hold the road, which is frequently built up
along rock ledges through gorges and could be so destroyed by
blasting that several days’ repairs would be required to make
it passable for pack animals.
Above the cliffs of the defiles rise steep mountain sides and
lateral communications from valley to valley are limited to pre
cipitous sheep paths, which can be used by small “guerilla ”
bands of Persians living on the country independent of com
munications, but are practically inaccessible to any organized
force.
Small bodies of troops could hold positions dominating the
defiles above obstacles such as a destroyed path or bridge.
Their flanks would rest secure and the enemy be limited to a
single narrow line of approach.
The dense forest and undergrowth in the “Miyanband’
sections of most valleys limit the field of vision on either side
of the tracks to less than 10 yards. They are impassable except
to natives and afford effective cover to snipers.
South of the “Northern watershed” the valleys of Nur,
Shahrud, and Kizil Uzun afford lateral lines of communication
from East to West so that in summer intercommunication
between parties occupying these routes in the highlands South of
the “ Secondary or Northern watershed ” is less impossible than
between parties attempting to ascend them from the coast.
Within these provinces the position is reversed and they are
most vulnerable from the sea.
Rudisar-Langarud-Lahijan-Rasht-Kasma is the only lateral
road from East to West ever passable for wheeled transport in
these provinces and inland lateral communications for pack
1 The Fi-iizkuh rente from Tehran to Mashad-i-Sar is the only one of these
tracks, which cresses a low and well defined pass.
Strategical
conditions }
within
these provincea
and command
of them from
the Sea.