ملف ١٩١٦/٤٩٣١ "الجزيرة العربية [نجد]: إعانة مالية لابن سعود. دفع إعانة مالية مصرح بها في ١ يناير ١٩١٧. التحقيق في واقعة. مدفوعات تمت من دون موافقة الخزينة" [و‎‎٨‎٤] (٤١٨/١٧٦)

the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean until we become powerful enough to
defend (them) ourselves. It is therefore necessary to take such action as will
protect British interests and at the same time will preserve all the rights of
independence” (p. 117).
Later, on the occasion of the first French Mission to the Hejaz at the beginning
of October, 1916, Sherif Husein consulted His Majesty’s Government through
Abdullah as to the form of his reply to the greeting brought by rhe Mission from the
French Government . 21 And in the same connection he informed Colonel Wilson at
Jeddah that “he would much prefer that no one helped him except the British
Government ” 22 Again, in telephone conversations on the 1 st November, 1916, and
the 2 nd November, 1916, on the subject of Husein’s assumption of the Boyal title,
Abdullah referred to Great Britain as “ our sole and respectable Ally,” and the King
himself remarked that “ if any other Government were to ask him to do what he was
doing now, he would not accept it, but knowing that the British Government was
popular and just, he accepted to take it.”
Such declarations must, of course, be discounted in view of the circumstances in
which they were made and the fact that they were made by Orientals ; but there is
little doubt that they represent the genuine desire of King Husein and his sons.
Relation of Commitments under (v) to British Desiderata.
His Majesty’s Government have committed themselves to no special position
towards King Husein which is incompatible with their agreements with France. So
long as our good relations with France do not suffer, it is clearly our interest that we
should have a predominant position with King Husein and any other Arab rulers in
the independent area. On the other hand, one of the King’s strongest motives for
seeking to place us in a special position towards himself, as representative of the Arab
movement throughout the-independent area, is the idea that he may eventually play
us off against France. This appears, for example, in the following passage on the
boundary question in his fourth letter to Sir H. McMahon of the 1 st January, 1916 :
“ I do not find it necessary to draw your attention to the fact that our plan is
of greater security to the interests and presumption of the rights of Great Britain
than it is to us, and will necessarily be so whatever may happen, so that Great
Britain may finally see all her own peoples in that contentment _and advancement
which she is endeavouring to establish for them now; especially as her Allies
being neighbours to us will be the germ of difficulties and discussion with which
there will be no peace of mind. In addition to which the people of Beirout will
decidedly never accept such isolation, and they may oblige us to undertake
new measures which may exercise Great Britain, certainly not ^ less ^ than her
present troubles, because of our belief and certainty in the reciprocity of qur
interests, which is the only cause that caused us never to care to negotiate with
any other Power but you ” (p. 113).
His eagerness to deal solely witffius thus has its embarrassing side.
(vi.) Sherif Rnsehi s Title.
In his correspondence wdth SirH. McMahon Sherif Husein repeatedly declared himself
to be speaking in the name of the Arab people. This claim was reiterated in each o
his first four letters (pp. 40, 45, 46, 93, 95), as well as in his letter of the 28th Decem
ber, 1915 to Sir Ali Morghani (p. 11 7). The most emphatic statement of it was perhaps
the following:—
“ Had it not been for the determination which I see in the Arabs for the
attainment of their objects, I would have preferred to seclude myself on one of the
heights of a mountain—but they, the Arabs, have insisted that I shou d gui e
the movement to this end ’’ (p. 95).
On the question of the boundaries of Arab independence, he was at particular pains
to make it clear that he was not putting forward mere personal demands but acting as
mandatory of the Arab inhabitants of the territories in question. ^ .
This claim was based on his relations with the Arab Nationalist organisations,
civilian and military, which had sprung up in the Arab provinces of Turkey with tieu*
si 201319/16. 23 220970/16.