مجموعة ٦ / ٨ (١) "سلسلة مطبوعة: ١٩٢٩ إلى ١٩٣٨". [و‎‎٤‎٤] (١٠٦٢/٩٢)

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itself on the Arabian coast of the Red Sea. We had meticulously observed
our own part of this Understanding, even to the extent of holding aloof in
cases where we might have obtained a dominant position for ourselves in
matters connected with Saudi Arabia. X hoped that the Italian Government
would be equally scrupulous in keeping to their part of the Understanding,
but I felt bound to say that the words and actions of certain Italians had done
much to lend colour to the doubts which were felt in certain quarters here
as to the ultimate intentions of Italy in regard to the Yemen. Our own policy
was, however, perfectly clear and simple. We desired to see the independent
Arab States remain independent and strong. We had no desire whatever to
extend our influence beyond those limited spheres in Arabia in which we were
legally entitled to exercise it, and any rumours to the contrary were merely
malicious inventions.
5. As regards the particular cases to which Signor Crolla had alluded*
I could tell him quite frankly what had been the object of Sir R. Bullard’s
journey. As Signor Crolla knew, we were faced with an extremely difficult
problem in Palestine resulting from our conflicting obligations. The Royal
Commission had now produced a Report and recomendations, which might
well arouse strong feelings on both sides. We had felt it essential to ensure
that the Commission’s Report and recommendations should be clearly under
stood by the leading personalities in the Arab world, and that there should
be no risk of unnecessary misunderstanding owing to incomplete or inaccurate
information. We had therefore decided to send Sir R. Bullard to Riyadh to
explain the Report and recommendations of the Commission and the con
clusions of His Majesty’s Government thereon frankly and accurately to King
Ibn Saud the day before those documents were published in this country.
This had involved Sir R. Bullard reaching Riyadh with the Report and con
clusions of His Majesty’s Government not later than July 6th, and, seeing that
the Report had not been in our hands until the evening of June 22nd, it had
not been physically possible to arrange this without sending the necessary
documents to him by air. I had myself been responsible for the proposal,
to send the two aircraft to Jedda, and had only hit upon this way of sending the
papers to Sir R. Bullard after I had found that all the other methods of com
munication would have been too slow. It was quite possible that Sir B.
Bullard might take the opportunity of his visit to Riyadh to discuss any other
outstanding matters with the King, hut the object of his 3 ourne y wa "
ly simple and straightforward, and it was absurd to read deep ulterior pol
cal motives into it, or to represent it as implying any change of policy on
our part. ,
a As regards what Signor Crolla had said about our adopting a forward
policy hf the Wnterland 0/the Hadhramaot and extending our authonty
round to the back of the Yemen, this was equally off the rails. There had
Wn no ouestion whatever of our extending our authority m this area. T
bountoies^f the Adtn Protectorate dated from before f e war “d from the
legal boundaries of our sphere of influence both in Persian Gulf
Protectorate and in that of our Arab protected States m3
were laid down m the *w°. noth i<m IS E June 1914, Nos. 71-
1S. E. Dec. 1903, Nos. 1-245] and March 9th, 1914 Lb.^June^^^
115], and the relevant article was Article 3 convention had been pub-
laid down the so-called blue and a t ies ' ( X933 Edition, Volume XI, page
lishedin Volume XI bntd hv it and as regards the north-west
42). The legal position was still governe by t ^ confirmed by the
frontier of the Aden Protectorate, their ' n 0 f which provided for the
Anglo-Yemeni Treaty of 1934 (Gmd 4630), Ar ° ever bee ^ any question
maintenance of the existing fron ler. , this line, and the last thing
whatever of our extending our ““^Xyondlt and adopt a forward
we should contemplate doing was to penet “ h y had n0 lega i claim. As
territorial policy in spheres m respect f whic d to the <■ V ioi e t
regards the Aden Protectorate, whichleg^ y 1 from Has Dharbat
line ” to the north-west, and up to a line running