مجموعة ٦ / ٨ (١) "سلسلة مطبوعة: ١٩٢٩ إلى ١٩٣٨". [ظ‎‎٤‎٧‎٦] (١٠٦٢/٩٥٧)

other side the rebels are also believed to be well armed but one may i n f
from the deputations and appeals to the Sheikh of Koweit and their anxi t
to avail themselves of the Koweit grazing grounds that they
severely handicapped by lack of supplies. Numerically also ^ ^
must be at a great disadvantage.
6. The chief weakness of the King’s position lies in the inferior mo 1
of his army as compared with the fanatic enthusiasm and desperate cour
of the Akhwan, and in the general unpopularity of his rule. As a result^f
the latter, it is generally believed that except in Nejd proper the majoritv f
the tribes wmuld rise at once if there were any reasonable hope of throw' 01
off his yoke. Added to this in the fact that he is unable to rely on a lar^
number of troops who have been enrolled in the south by attractive promi^ 6
and by enforced levies, and who have not their heart in the fight • th 868
include for instance a number of Arabs of the Ataibah tribe of which seve^
sections are in open defection. Many of these troops have been sent t
Medina and thence drafted to other bases, while some seven thousand ^
distributed at different posts between Taif and Henakiya to provide asa' 81 ^
surprises. In Nejd itself, to judge from the small number of tribal chiefs of
importance who are reported to be with him at Riyadh, he does not anne -
to have succeeded in rallying the tribes to his side and has had to fill v'
ranks largely with townsmen.
7. Another weakness is the fact that the defection of the Akhwan fa
to a large extent discredited him among the more fanatical and influential
elements of his own following. People like Abdulla bin Hassan, a descend
ent of Abdul Wahab, who was chiefly responsible for the recent dismissal"
of the Imams at Mecca and Medina, Abdulla bin Alaihid until last vear
Grand Wadi of Mecca, Mohammad bin Ali Turky who resigned the same nost
a few month ago, are commonly believed to favour the Akhwan cause while
Abdul Latif, another descendent of Abdul Wahab and one of the most in
fluential Ulemas at Riyadh is reported to have left Riyadh and to havP
definitely gone over to Feisal ed Doweish. Ibn Sand is beginning to be
regarded by these fanatics as no longer true to Wahabi tenets and as beim
himseif now no better than an infidel. Thoir support of him is in any case
likely to be lukewarm only as they themselves would stand to lose by any
diminution of the fanatical Akhwans influence. ^ ^
Q r| 8 M SignS inci ? ents are not wanting to alarm the inhabitants of Jeddah
end Mecca. Following on the recent coup of Feisal ed Doweish at Gaya
came the news, confirmed from various sources, of the Emir Saud’s narrow
^^e L n M C To U wr Ha !?’ u When f " n ^ of ~en
followed by the defection of theBun AL^fhhe^ddrh^h 116 ''' f )Th
tesgrS'iSS rS lthy - »• 4 - m*.- 1 .';;
in the gro^inglruCTilence^of the" r dfi e ^ aZ !, iaS ’ ts re P ercuss wn in the south
have lately been committed by them. a I mavrefe ^ t° f a .f ression wWch
the two caravans on the Mecca-Taif road where n r ? to A e at(:a ^ s ™
to exist, and I may mention the m of aTT,? ^ S T e T Cunty was thou 8 Ilt
religious prestige was expected to Puaranteth1m la 'f” Hassan whose great
to Riyadh whither he was being sent with n/® L paFSage f ? m MeCca
bon. He was apparently allowed bv The t and ammum '
most solemn assurances that he would TeeA. tn h * 1 ° P roce ® d after § lvin g tlie
Bujad, but from all accounts thTonld armoli^^f re ease * their chief, Bin
by the Ataibah. to ° arms an< ^ ammunition were retained
against their! underlhT the P unitive expedition sent
been checked “feated an leader Khalid Cowai has
to Khunna, whitheS^ t0 W
turbul(3nt, connected by blood relaf h? 7* ng t ^ le , A taibah to heel. Naturally
to the recalcitrant Mulair have h? ^ - th6 Ashrar and aMn aiS °
’ 1 y l!ave Utterly become impatient over the