"١٤/ ٦ النفط في البحر في الخليج الفارسي" [و‎‎١‎٧] (٣٨/٣٣)

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conception would look on the mat). The Stat* 4 ^
a^a^on'whic^the situation ' 11 ' 1 b * g ° 0d ?i? OUgh to P rovide us with 8
between^Bahrain*and*Qatar. I,0V ® B ^* r about the boundaries
were ratherhdifferent^^yours? 1 " th The r iran m Section o^th^St t deaS
Ba^in en th SUgeeS M d ^ in s P ite of recent excitement ov«
tobp^r.-f«w he q S5 Sti0n mi f ht n ot really be fundamental importance
to Persian, They were inclined to believe that more trouble m-feb-i-
be caused by enabling the Persians to say that the states on the®
the t Unitfd e st a ? h 0 re v,°5 « he Gulf * backed b y the United Kingdom and
caused SWUng 4 fast one ° n them", than wluld be
caused if all the states concerned, including Persia were
ed at the same time. The Persian Government would certainlv P make
some fuss, but the Iran Section felt that they might nossiblev
accept the idea in the end, perhaps with a reservation that their
states* 11 ?? n0t b ? ^ k * n b0 Prejudice the?? c?aiSs. ^he other
states, if they accept the scheme need not agree with anv Pardon
th Th | St ? te G *P? rtln « nt offici??r e co?ce?n?d y ex"e S s?ed
the view that the Persian Claim to Bahrain was verv weak hnt
suggested that it was more likely to be remitted by the Persian
Government to some international authority if the Persians felt
that they had been bounced 11 . If this view were acdent^d
be*informed at’th 6 would be of less importance since Persia would
the^iffM^n-i??. 1 ^ v,?®?!* tlm t as th * other states. We pointed out
Persiin f Mfisil nnd?? y° u foresee - and the additional one that a
schlm? P r oP°f al » might prejudice the whole
scneme. fhey emphasised that their views on this point were
personal and were intended simply for discussion.
( l uest ^ on whether* sovereignty over those parts of the
seabed where it was desired to grant concessions shouldbe asserted
ZZ™* c 2 nC 5 r ^ d ^ the State D «P^tment share the vieSs exp!
l tu 0f * he Foreign Office despatch under reference/
and they think therefore, that this should be done.
wh*n *v^° n f ut ? r ? Procedure, the State Department consider that
principles and boundaries have been decided between our
two governments, it would be desirable for the United Kingdom
Government to approach the Arab states under their protection, and
®° vernme i lt and th « United States Government to approach
the rest jointly, or in concert - i.e. they agree generally with
the views expressed in the first three sentences of para 5 of the
th^lr g no?nf iC r d ® spat ^ und « r reference. They added that, from
aalnt would be much b ®^ter to wait until some
f ^ft le3 ^ ne problem appeared to be in sight, but hoped
wouU be the ease by the time our two goverLents are
Rpe ready to take action.
10. They raised two additional points. The first was that of
secrecy. ylg»a-vis the oil companies. Some interest in off-share
wS?!! S f i0nS ha ? £ een ex P r * ssed ^ some United States oil companies
iL+ aV n’ an 2 b F scm « which have not, concessions in the area.
The 3ate Department felt that all oil companies shoud have an equal
opportunity of bidding for concessions in hhe areas with which we
are dealing, and hope that you will agree with this. If so/th^y
suggest that', at the moment when our two governments approach the
states concerned, a press release should be issued about what is
proposed, #e so that everyone would start on an equal footing,
if this were delayed beyond that moment, one or other of the
governments concerned would certainly tell one or other of the oil
companies, an d this were done by the Saudi-Arabian Government
for example, the Arabian American oil Company would start with an
advantage. The second point on which they would be grateful for
information is whether H.M.G. haver formally adopted, or are likely
? s a ?® sdlt °£ tb ? s « discussions, the principal of the
Continental Shelf for the division of seabed areas in g&neral.