"سيستان" [ظ‎‎٣‎٢‎٤] (٧٨٢/٦٥٠)

concern, and that we feel no hesitation in appealing to Her Majesty’s Government
for a frank and generous recognition of this common responsibility.
8 . The telegraphic interests of Great Britain in Persia may he said to he
evenly divided between the mother-country and India. lor whilst on the one
hand the wires that have heen constructed between the north-west frontier and
Tehran, and which provide the earlier link in the Persian section of the main
overland connection with the East, are in the hands of a Company whose
domicile is in London, from Tehran onwards to the Gulf the undertaking is
conducted by an establishment that is recruited and paid for by the Govern
ment of India, while its head-quarters are in the India Office in London.
This two-fold system exists in order to maintain a connection which may be
said to be equally British and Indian, since it is equally indispensable to the
interests of both countries; but which also has an ulterior and wider scope,
inasmuch as the Trans-Persian wires, and the sub-marine cables by which they
are supplemented in the Persian Gulf, are largely utilised for the conveyance
of messages between Great Britain and places lying beyond India, notably the
Australasian Colonies. Prom a calculation based upon the aggregate results
of the past five years, we have ascertained that no less than 30 per cent of
the total traffic is of this description. Nevertheless the cost, in so far as it is
borne by either Government, devolves exclusively upon the Indian, and not
upon the Home, Exchequer.
9. Such are the main interests of Great Britain in Persia. It will be
observed that the shares that may be claimed by the mother-country and by
India in the sum total of those interests, have in the passage of time become so
interwoven and fused as to render the task of separating or distinguishing them
neither easy nor profitable. It may not be difficult, as we shall endeavour to
argue later on, to distinguish between sources of expenditure which should more
properly fall to the charge of the one or the other partner. But we maintain
that enough has been said to prove that on the broad field of international policy
Persia is not exclusively an Indian interest, but is emphatically an Imperial
interest of Great Britain ; and that the latter should be prepared to exert her full
strength for the defence of that interest, should it be jeopardised or impugned.
10 . In discussing the manner in which it is desirable that these principles, if
accepted, should be carried into action, we are anxious at the outset to make our
position, in one respect, perfectly clear. We have no desire to make an addition
to the political or territorial responsibilities of India, for which we have not, under
existing conditions, the means either in money or in men. We are not about to
propose that there should be established any Protectorate, open or covert, over
any part of the Shah’s dominions, that might compel us in the future to hold
the country so protected by force of arms. We can conceive of circumstances
that might some day tempt both the Indian and the Home Governments from
this attitude of reserve, and that would in a case where the vital interests of the
Empire were at stake, force us to consider a burden for which our shoulders
are still unprepared. But for the present our ambitions are exclusively limited
to making secure the interest which we have already built up, and still more
to pie\ enting it from being undermined or taken from, us by others, with the
result not only of a considerable accretion of strength to them, but of positive
detriment to ourselves. We have, in fine, no desire to disturb the political
stains quo in Persia so long as it can be maintained. We prefer indeed, weak
as it is, to invest it with such renewed vitality as may be found possible. But
we P re ss for an early decision and for early action, since, unless we bestir our
selves, there is good reason for fearing that the already trembling balance may
be disturbed by others to our disadvantage.
. , nc ! w proceed to draw a picture of the present state of British
m eres s m Persia, as they present themselves to our eyes, and to examine the
dangers by which they appear to be threatened. Sir M. Durand has to a cer
tain extent anticipated us m this task ; and in so far as he has touched upon
e same ground as that which we propose to cover, we shall not recapitulate