"سيستان" [و‎‎٣‎٨‎٧] (٧٨٢/٧٧٥)

infallible prelude to the absorption of Manchuria; and it renders absolutely
inevitable the ultimate B/ussian control over the northern provinces and the
capital.
8. As a student of Russian aspirations and methods for fifteen years, I
assert with confidence—what I do not think that any one of her own statesmen
would deny—that her ultimate ambition is the dominion of Asia. She conceives
herself to be fitted for it by temperament, by history, and by tradition. It is a
proud and a not ignoble aim, and is well worthy of the supreme moral and
material efforts of a vigorous nation. But it is not to be satisfied by piecemeal
concessions, neither is it capable of being gratified save at our expense.
Acquiescence in the aims of Russia at Tehran and Meshed will not save Seistan.
Acquiescence in Seistan will not turn her eyes from the Gulf. Acquiescence in
the Gulf will not prevent intrigue and trouble in Baluchistan. Acquiescence
at Herat and in Afghan Turkistan will not secure Kabul. Acquiescence in the
Pamirs will not save Kashgar. Acquiescence at Kashgar will not divert
Russian eyes from Tibet. Each morsel but whets the appetite for more, and
inflames the passion for a pan-Asiatic dominion. If Russia is entitled to these
ambitions, still more is Great Britain entitled, nay compelled, to defend that
which she has won, and to resist the minor encroachments which are only a
part of the larger plan. Like many other students of the Asian problem, I
have often pondered, at each stage from Korea to the Bosphorus, whether we
could not, by a friendly agreement with Russia, arrive at such a demarcation
of our respective interests as would enable us to eschew rivalry and to cultivate
an amicable co-operation, if not an actual alliance, in the future. At each stage
I have found that in such an agreement the giving would be all on our side
and the receiving on the other. The satisfaction of Russian interests could
not be attained except by an intolerable sacrifice of our own. Simultaneously
my inclinations towards such an understanding have not been encouraged by
a study of the manner in which similar efforts have been met or have been
observed in the past. The better and the safer policy seems to be for Great
Britain at each point upon the long line of contact to frame her policy and
to declare it. The West Ridgeway Convention and the public statement of
Lord Lufferin that its infraction would be followed by war, has for sixteen
years saved the Zulfikar-Bosaga section of the frontier. Persia will not be
saved except by some similar declaration.
9. I now proceed to examine the effect that would be produced upon
India, were Russia permitted to gratify her ambitions by constructing a
Russian railway through Persia, and acquiring a Russian port in the Persian
Gulf.
10. It is not open to doubt that these enterprises, and the power
for pressure and control which they would give, would be followed at no
distant interval by the destruction of the Persian monarchy as an independent
kingdom, and its incorporation, on much the same footing as Bokhara or
Khiva, in the dominions of the Czar. The north of Persia is already within
the grasp of Russia, and can be absorbed or annexed by her whenever she
desires. A railway from the north to the south would be the link by which the
same process would be extended southwards until it reached the ocean. The
lateral connections, eastwards and westwards, might for a while be delayed.
Sooner or later they would follow. A Shah might be left ujjon the throne, just
as there is a Khan at Khiva and an Amir at Bokhara. We also have our
Asiatic Princes in India, and we know that they are not incompatible with a
European dominion.
11. But it may be said, why not let Persia be swallowed up, as the Central
Asian Khanates have successively been ? What is Persia to Great Britain or to
India ? A sufficient answer might probably be found in the history of the past
100 years. It is inconceivable that a succession of Indian Governments and
of British statesmen for a century can all have been so blind as to have
expended the efforts of a ceaseless diplomacy and millions of money upon an
object which, after all, was of little value or concern. Even, however, if we