ملف ٤٩٢٩\ ١٩١٨ "الجزيرة العربية: العلاقات مع ابن رشيد" [و‎‎٦‎٧] (٤٧١/١٣٨)

(P 930) h'vom Civil Commissioner, Bayhdad, 29th Januari/ 1920.
{Repeated to Commodore, Constantinople, copy by post to India and General Officer
Commanding in Chief, who has seen, before issue.)
(Received 4th February, 2 p.m.)
(U.) 1301. Rair-az-Zor.
Ramadan Shallash has left for Aleppo. He has been succeeded by Maulud
Pasha, who, so far from adopting different attitude, is also actively inciting tribes
throughout Mesopotamia to active revolt and rebellion. 11 is letters have reached tribes
as far as Amara.
There is no indication that these letters are having any particular effect, but
Shammar, between the Tigris and the Euphrates, north of Baghdad, need little
encouragement to start campaign of pillage.
Maulud Pasha appears to be well supplied with funds, and according to all
reports is both offering and paying considerable sums to tribal leaders, whom he
believes to be capable of causing disturbances in our territory.
Like Ramadan Shallash, he has been threatening lives of Political Officers by
letter, and a small party from Dair-az-Zor recently waylaid Political Officer on his
way from Albu-Kamal to Ramadi. Attempt was luckily unsuccessful.
The Anaizah, under Fahad Beg Bin Hadhdhal, and the Dulaim, under Ali
Suleiman, are in the vicinity of Albu-Kamal and are anxious to re occupy Dair-az-Zor
on our behalf. They are prepared to do so without any military or financial
assistance from us.
My present instructions to the Political Officers concerned are that both these
tribes should be restrained from taking more than a passive part, as we do not wish
to appear to be imitating the Arab Government by inciting tribes to rise. It is,
however, a game at which two can play, if necessary.
Tribes in neighbourhood of Mayadin and Salahinoh have given us to understand
that they are willing and indeed anxious to assist us, but their confidence has been
greatly weakened by recent events at Dair-az-Zor, and until we are in a position to
guarantee them immunity from vengeance of the Arab Government subsequent to
further sudden change of frontiers, they do not propose to do more than sit on the
fence.
All available local evidence indicates that representatives of the Arab Govern
ment are locally pursuing an active hostile line and that substantial portion of their
subsidy is being devoted to encouragement of anarchy in Mesopotamia, and to incite
ment of tribes both within and beyond our frontier to attack our troops and to
murder our officers.
Apart, however, from the Dair-az-Zor incident, these efforts, which have been
actively maintained since the armistice, cannot be considered to have had hitherto
any marked effect on the general political situation in Mesopotamia.