مجموعة ٢٨/١١٢أ "بلاد فارس. تبريز - رسائل شهرية عن الوضع الداخلي في أذربيجان وتقارير متنوعة." [و‎‎٥‎٥‎٨] (١٢٣٧/١١١٨)

I
V
that there must be some overwhelmingly strong reason for continuing in the
present policy. I have suspected that Russian military strength in Azerbaijan,
far from being an increasing threat to Turkey, is low and that they are genuinely
^^orried about the Turkish frontier themselves. If we were in their place, sharing
^JPeir apprehensions about Turkey, hearing perhaps of the chauvinistic remarks
which Turkish officials are capable of making, I think we, too, should consider it
our duty to neglect no means and to examine the possibility that the Kurds might
serve for defensive operations. I have noted from your telegrams to the Foreign
Office that the Persian authorities and the Turkish Ambassador have suggested
that the Russians have considered using the Kurds against the Turks; it seems
to me that this need not be a matter for excitement or resentment in any quarter.
Both Turks and Persians whom I have met say that the Kurds have no military
value in the modern sense and I think the Russians themselves would agree that
for attack they have none, although it might be argued that for defence, on
their own ground, they might be of some use. Hence, possibly, their tenderness
for the Kurds.
I have several times, in conversation with my Russian colleagues, sensed a
revulsion when the possibility of military action against the Kurds was
threatened. I therefore concluded that they would at all costs avoid hostilities
with them. The signs of a firmer attitude which I saw at Rezaieh, and the
Russian casualties—tw T o killed—in a brush with the Kurds near Khoi the other
day, gave me some hope that the Russians were really resolved to restore order
before the Persian troops arrived. I' have since been informed that the Russian
patrols in Western Azerbaijan, far from smiting the Kurds whom they find
prowling about, shake hands with them, enquire why they are not in their
villages, and remind them that it is forbidden to do this and that. They then
pass on. Now the Persian commander has informed me, on the authority of the
Russian general, that an emissary has been sent to treat with the Shekak minority
which caused the trouble near Khoi and that they regard the clash as an accident
whidh would not have occurred had they been able to talk with the Kurds
beforehand. Moreover, according to the Persian commander, the general has
“ advised ” him not to try to disarm any Kurds. I must therefore revert to my
original idea that the Russians will do their utmost to avoid hostilities with any
Kurds, and that the policy of tenderness will continue.
Is not the solution for this impasse to be sought on the Russian front ? If
the Russians are successful there, they will not, I feel sure, continue their present
policy, which must be unsatisfactory for their political officers and distasteful to
their soldiers. If this interpretation is correct, we cannot but feel sympathy with
them in their concern, even if their policy of nursing the Kurds seems hardly
worth while to us. I do not know what the prospects may be of persuading them
to revise their policv here, but I judge that it would be difficult and perhaps
hardly worth while. The issue will be decided on the Russian front before many
months. _ . D
I have, &e.
R. W. URQUHART.
7H/J U
rio.y