‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي." [ظ‎‎٥‎٢] (٣٨٤/١٠٩)

mmm
6
„ The question was then diseusse.l whether, though it migl.t be impossible
26. me qucsiiun w Ril •„ f r t i ie ^ 0 i n t patronage and development
to conclude an agreement with Ru a n j reco g n i t ioa of British and
of Persia, yet it ofthe Shah! on lines analogous to
Russian s P here8 ° ldd ' b t ptweea England and Russia as to spheres of interest
the agreement conclud g uc t, an a (T r eement might he equally extended
in relation to vadways m Ohm Such m un | ertaUin ^ / nd WO uld
to mines, roads, and , 0 ‘ h , e n 3^f in fl U ence also, even though not expressly
to a certain degree extend to pobtioa innuen e^ ^ * and tl . ade , ha t
mentioned, as m eas ern conn . rji| e ij no ac ross Persia would have to
political V^^f^h^rseJanin the British sphere, and it would
, ,,, y , 1iv „: f , ipr mr tv on the opposite side of the line, since it
wouldbe e o 0 ut of'the question to remove the" British representatives, either at
Tehran Tabriz or Meshed, while corresponding objection would no doubt he fel
hv the Russian Government. But even an engagement limited to railway ami
commercial exploitation would have considerable value. The following d.tficu .
Re and drawlicks in the case of such an understanding were then discussed.
The line proposed was not altogether assisted by geographical conditions, Seistan
being nlSllv and administratively a part of the province of Khorasan, and
it was doubtful whether Kussia would forego her designs upon Seistan and a port
on the eastern extremity of the Persian Gulf. A more serious drawback, how
ever, was the fact that the capital of Persia would lie in the Ru-sian sphere, and the
pressure exercised by the Russian Government would become overwhelming, the
Shall would tend move and more to become a Russian puppet, and i ort iein eiMa
a Russian proconsulate. The fate of such institutions as the Imperial Bank of
Persia and the Indo-European Telegraph Department would be more than
doubtful, the weight and influence of Russia throughout Central Asia uou d be
increased and the ultimate result might be the permanent break-up ot the
Persian kingdom. Nor would this policy prevent Russia trom approaching
the Persian Gulf via Baghdad, or other countries from attempting to acquire the
position in Southern Persia from which Russia had debarred hermit. But,
while not sanguine of success, the Government of Lord Curzon expressed them
selves of opinion that the experiment was worthy of being made, m tne interest
both of Persia itself, and still more of harmony between the two great Powers,
upon whose relations the peace of Asia depends. Such a contract, even it not
of perpetual duration, would be of immense value in the respite allorded ±rom
the strain of an otherwise ceaseless rivalry and in the opportunity presented tor
a peaceful consolidation of existing interests.
24. Should, however, the endeavour to arrive at an understanding with
Russia fail, then it would still be possible to fall back upou the alternative
policy recommended by Sir M. Durand which was that we should plainly
intimate that any Russian encroachments in Northern Persia would provoke
corresponding measures for the protection of British interests in the south.
25. The despatch then tin ned to the increase of the Consular establishments
in Persia Lord Curzon recommended that Consular representatives should he
appointed at Kermanshah, Ahwaz and Bunder Abbas, that Kerman should bo
made a permanent Consulate, that a Native Agent should be posted to B impair
and Seistan and that a British officer should be sent to the latter place if the
rumoured nomination of a Russian Consul turned out true. The principle on
which the cost should be met by Great Britain or India was then discussed.
2G. On examination of the cost of the various establishments maintained
by the British Government in Persia, it was shown that the Imperial Govern
ment spent £15,400 and the Government of India £01,052 per annum, or, if
Turkish Arabia were included in the calculation, the totals amounted to,
Great Britain £15,597, India £71,050, contributions which did not at all fairly
represent the respective proportions of Imperial and of Indian interests in Persia
and its surroundings. Two principles might with advantage, in the opinion of
the Government of India, be borne in mind in distributing such charges between
Great Britain and India, namely, (1) either the entire charges might he added
together and divided in certain proportions be!ween the Imperial and Indian
Exchequers, or [2) the spheres in Persia of special concern either to Her Majesty s