‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي." [و‎‎٥‎٤] (٣٨٤/١١٢)

9
‘the' letter of the late Shah’s promise, and which might be extremely injurious to the interests
which it is our duty to defend. We are fortified in this view by the fact that, in the few
months that have lapsed since the present Shah was reminded of this promise, parties of
Russian Engineers, with Persian passports, Persian escorts, and Persian official encouragement,
have been openly travelling about Southern Persia, inspecting and surveying the lines of possible
railways, and concluding their studies by a close investigation of the character and capabilities
of the terminal ports on the Persian Gulf. These proceedings appear to us to reflect no small
suspicion upon the attitude of the Persian Government, and do not encourage us to look with
great hopefulness to the future.
“We are also gratified to hear that the Persian Government has been reminded, both of
another written engagement, entered into by the late Shah, to the effect that ‘ the Customs of
Southern Persia shall never be placed under foreign supervision and control \ and of Lord
Salisbury’s intimation of April 1H99, that ‘ it would not be compatible with the interests of
the British Empire that any European Power should exercise ci)ntrol or jurisdiction ov r er the
ports of the Persian Gulf. ’ The value of these guarantees appears to us to depend entirely
upon the manner in which they continue to be interpreted by the Persian, and to be defended
Iby Her Majesty’s Government. If faithfully observed and resolutely enforced, if no attempt
to evade or elude them on the part of others be permitted, they represent in substance the
policy f.>r which the Government of India, with an insistence that is justified by the magnitude
of the stake, have throughout c ontended. If any doubt as to their efficacy be permissible, it
can only be because of the difficulty of placing implicit reliance upon the assurances of a feeble
Oriental State, and because they appear to us to lie somewhat in advance of the less definite
propositions that have found a place in the earlier paragraphs of Your Lordship’s despatch.
Eor instance, when Your Lordship speaks in paragraph b of the importance of safeguarding
those spheres of influence in Pers : a which are essential to India, we should have been glad to
know what in Your Lordship’s judgment they are. Our own views on the matter were very
clearly laid down in our despatch of last September, but we have not been informed whether
they are or are not concurred in by Her Majesty’s Government The successful defence, either
of a sphere of influence, or of the interests which have grown up inside it, would appear to
demand as a preliminary condition an explicit agreement as to the limits and dimensions of
the former, and as to the nature and obligations of the latter.
Entertaining as we do these opinions, we greatly regret the abandonment of the contem
plated visit of His Majesty the Shah to England in the past month; since we had hoped that
advantage might be taken of his presence to invest with the fullest definiteness and precision
the nature of the policy of Her Majesty’s Government with regard to Persia and t) Southern
Persia in particular ; and since we had relied much upon such a clear understanding for the
future protection of Indian interests in that part of the East. We trust that an opportunity
for making such a declaration may still present itself. ”
30. The desired opportunity of making the proposed declaration to the Shah
did not present itself till two years later when he visited London in August 1902.
31. Meanwhile the Russian Government steadily pursued their forward
course. Negotiations for a further Russian loan were already in progress.
Important manifestations of Russian activity in Seistan ; their efforts to secure
the dismissal of the Hashmat-ul-Mulk and secure a creature of their own ; their
attempt to purchase the revenue of the province more than confirmed the fore
casts contained in the despatch of 1899, and lent additional weight to
the appeal already made by the Government of India for a clear emphatic
enunciation of British policy in regard to Persia. That views similar to those held
by the Government of India were now impressing themselves on Her Majesty’s
Government was apparent by explicit declarations, one to the Russian the other
to the Persian Government, in two matters of the gravest importance. In
June 1901, Lord Lansdowne instructed the British Minister at Tehran to speak
to the Sadr Azam and dwell on the importance of our commercial interests in
Seistan. This was followed up in July 1901 by a despatch in which Lord
Lansdowne formulated in an unmistakeable manner the view r s of His Majesty’s
Government with respect to Seistan and the Minister was instructed to request
• Foi 1 further details see umleY Russian activity in &U ftSSUranC© (subsequently gl\ Cn) to be
Seistan, Chapter xvi, paragraphs 41 - 42 , page 139 . placed on formal* record that the Persian
Government would never pledge the revenues of Seistan as security for a loan
or otherwise to any Foreign Power or its subject. No less explicit were the ins-
tructionsf received in October 1901 by the
Hon’ble Mr. C. Hardinge, His Majesty’s
Charge d’Affaires at St. Petersburg!!, who was authorised to speak to Count
Lamsdorff frankly on the subject of a rumoured Russian loan, to point out the
inconveniences of independent discussion by the two Powers with Persia, to recall
the Anglo-Russian understanding, often re-affirmed, to maintain the independence
t Vide Chapter II, paragraph 20, page 28 infra.