‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي." [ظ‎‎١‎٠‎٣] (٣٨٤/٢١١)

the boundary line was marked on a small scale map. It was pointed out
that the Afghan officials were under a misapprehension as to the correct line,
and that as tliey and the Persians on the spot were both engaged on works and
counter-works which were contrary to the agreement, the disputes could only
be settled by the intervention of an officer of independent judgment, and
His Highness Avas informed that Major McMahon had been directed to
proceed at once on the road towards Seistan, which, with the Amir’s permission,
it was intended that he should reach via Khwaja Ali on the Helmand.
Meanwhile the local situation had been rendered less acute by a rise in the
river Helmand, which brought water to the lands of both disputants, and
Major Benn interviewed the Akhundzada, who promised to maintain the
status quo on condition that the Seistan Government \\ould give a similar
promise. This was agreed to by the Persian officials, except the Yamin-i-Nizam,
the officer in charge of the Seistan frontier, who throughout this dispute had
been Avorking in concert with the Russian Consulate and resented Major Penn’s
intervention as unnecessary.
24. But Russian interference in this affair was not limited to their local
representative in Seistan. In July the Russian Ambassador in London informed
Lord Lansdowne that his Government could not regard the incursion of the
Afghans near Nasratabad with indifference, and in communications which
ensued, the line was taken that as Russia bordered on Afghanistan and the
disturbances might spread, energetic measures on the part of Russia might be
necessitated if the unsatisfactory state of things in Seistan continued.
25. Russian efforts to prevent, or to take a share, in the Boundary Com
mission Avere likewise made in Tehran, and in December 1902 the Russian Minis
ter in London informed Lord Lansdowne that the Shah, on receiving reports of
the rising of the Helmand, said that in the circumstances it was unnecessary
to send a Commissioner. The explanation of this change of attitude was
that the Russian Minister had asked the Shah to allow a Russian delegate
to accompany the Persian Commissioner, to which His Majesty had consented,
and as, afterwards, it was felt that the British Government Avould demur to
this, the Shah proposed shelving arbitration altogether. Meanwhile, on 9th
December 1902, the Amir sent his reply to the Viceroy’s last letter, saying
that he A\ished to spare us the trouble and expense of a Mission on such a
matter, but that, as we considered it necessary, he would assist and arrange
for the passage of the mission by Khwaja Ali and the Helmand route and
would furnish supplies. He nominated the Akhundzada as the Afghan
Commissioner. The Viceroy proposed to the Secretary of State that this offer
should at once he accepted, and that Major McMahon should be ordered to start.
His hxc ellency added that the Persian Government having invited our assistance
could not now lie allowed to back out. The value of the mission lay not so
much in the settlement of the Seistan dispute as in the demonstration of
Anglo-Atghan cordiality, and in the oppoitunity provided for obtaining full
mloimation about the Helmand route and the lower course of that river.
Ou 26th December 1902, the sanction of the Secretary of State AA 7 as received
and on 10th January 1903 the mission started from Quetta. Major McMahon
AA'as given the local rank of Colonel and received a Royal Commission.
26. Hie situation in Seistan Avith which the British arbitrator was called
upon to deal A\ r as discussed by His Excellency with Colonel McMahon at a
conference held at Simla on 20th September 1902, and may be thus briefly
explained.
n difficulty to be confronted was the ambiguity of General
Goldsmid s award, owing to the circumstances under which his arbitration
Avas conducted in 1872. Is either he nor General Pollock, the representative
of the Indian Government, had any escort, and the Persian officials subjected
them to every possible restraint and annoyance, hampering their movements,
and e\ en refusing their admittance to several villages in Seistan. Generals
Goldsmid and Pollock agreed that “ all hope of fair enquiry was in vain, and
the sooner they left Seistan the better.” They left for Tehran in March, and
ainved there on 4th June 1872, General Goldsmid delivered his arbitral