‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي." [ظ‎‎١‎٢] (٣٨٦/٢٩)

Early in 190B the question of British policy in Persia was referred for
; T nwor^rnmmittee the consideration of the Committee of
March i9oV nperial ’ Imperial Defence, and the conclusions
formulated at a meeting held on the 22nd March 1905 were as follows
It is essential to maintain, and, if possible, to increase our influence at
Tehran in order that we may be able to control railway construction in 1 ersia,
which is by far the most important factor of the strategic situation.
(2) It should be our object, on commercial as well as on strategic grounds,
to maintain the status quo in Persia.
(3) It is essential to maintain our existing claims on the coast of the
Persian Gulf without aggression or otesntation.
(4) Pinancial assistance may be inevitable in certain cases, but is not
desirable in principle. Each case should be considered on its merits.
These conclusions, though communicated privately to Lord Curz.on, were
not imparted to the Government of India in any official manner. In June
of the same year, Sir Arthur Hardinge forwarded to the Government of India
a copy of a despatch in which he discussed the question of British policy in
Persia with special reference to the proposed partition into spheres ot influence.
The Minister pointed out that the inevitable result of such a course vrould be
the eventual establishment of what to all intents and purposes would amount
to Protectorates in Northern and Southern Persia; that even if the partition
permitted the exercise of Russian influence as far south as the head of the Gulf
in Western Persia, it was still doubtful w hether Russia would consent to be
excluded from the sea on the eastern side; while any proposal which contem
plated the complete exclusion of Russia from the sea was, in his opinion, ideally
impracticable. The course which Sir Arthur Hardinge preferred was one of
joint action with Russia with the common object of postponing the crisis
towards which the affairs of Persia seemed to tend.
On receipt of this communication, Lord Curzon again determined to
address His Majesty’s Government. Nothing, he explained, had occurred to
cause the Government of India to alter the views regarding the proposed
partition of Persia expressed in their despatch of September 1899, and he
urged the Secretary of State to permit the Government of India an opportunity
of°taking into their consideration any conclusions which might have been
formed either by the Defence Committee or by His Majesty’s Government.
“ The question ”, he wrote, “ of British policy in Persia, even if at times it
may slumber, is one of such vital moment to ourselves, and is so certain in the
future to assume a much more prominent place on the field of Asiatic politics
than it has yet done, that we feel that it should never for long be absent from
our consideration, but that each successive phase or development of it should
be made the subject of our anxious scrutiny. Though the checks which have
recent]v been experienced by Russia in her policy of Asiatic expansion may
he thought to have lessened the chances of an active programme of political
or territorial advance in Persia, we can feel by no means certain that they may
not have the opposite effect; wdiile in the growing weakness and incapacity
of the Central Persian authority it is difficult not to observe the evidences
of a disintegration that may at any time culminate in serious anarchy or
disaster ”.
No reply had been received to this despatch before Lord Curzon left India.