‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي". [ظ‎‎٩] (٣٨٦/٢٣)

6
guard British interests reported that, even in the southern dependency of
Khorasan, Russian influence was already predominant. Nor had Russian
activity been confined to the north and east. In the Gulf and in the interior
of South-West Persia, the sanitary pretext had been freely used as a cloak for
the despatch of numerous medical officers to Basra, Bushire, and Bunder
Abbas. The islands and coasts of Southern Persia had been visited and
surveyed by Russian officers, and reports had been current of Russian designs
upon the island of Kishm.
Simultaneously there had been evidence of special activity on the part of
other Powers. In 1896 Prance, the
Activity of other European Powers. a ]|y 0 £ R uss ia, had organised a State-
aided service of merchant steamers in the Gulf. In 1897 a Preneh Vice-
Consul had been appointed to Bushire. Designs were entertained for
obtaining a footing in Arabistan. A Prench agent had been posted to Lingah.
Negotiations had taken place for a Prench loan to the Persian Government
upon the security of the Customs of the Gulf ports and a promise of a railway
monopoly in the Shah’s dominions. Germany too had displayed an increasing
interest in the Gulf. Por long her policy had aimed at the control of the
principal railways in Asia Minor. The natural corrollary was the continuance
of this system to the shores of the Gulf. Already she had secured a concession
for a road from Khanikin to Tehran. A German Consulate had been
established at Bushire. Specially chartered German vessels had made their
appearance in the Gulf, and a German ship of war had followed in their
wake. These were our foremost rivals. But Turks, Spaniards, and Belgians
had also appeared upon the scene in furtherance of commercial or political
designs.
Individually these symptoms of external, and notably of Russian or of
Russophil, interest in Southern Persia might be of small importance. Collec
tively they indicated the policy and ambitions of other Powers in a manner
which was open to no misinterpretation, and provided unmistakeable evidence
Russian objects. °, f ‘l 16 determination of other nations to
challenge the special position acquired
by Great Britain in an area, by land and sea, which with good reason had
been regarded by the British Government as falling within their sphere
of influence. In particular, the Government of India could not but regard
with grave apprehension the advance of Russia across the desert which forms
a natural barrier of division between Northern and Southern Persia, and the
prospect of the appearance of the Russian flag in the Persian Gulf’ brought
with it a novel element of unrest into a situation that at no time had been
without its anxious features. It was evident that Russia regarded with
unconcealed aversion the opening of the British commercial route from India
to Seistan and Khorasan, and intended to spare no effort to rob it of success
and further that she viewed with an interested eye the future of Seistan
itself, and was preparing the way for the eventual inclusion within the
Russian sphere of that portion of the Shah’s dominions. The obiect of
their policy was no less apparent. Russia was determined not merely to
block a promising avenue of Anglo-Indian trade, and to acquire a position of
potential menace to British interests on the western flank of Afghanistan
but was also bent on the prosecution of an advance which could not be
expected to terminate until it brought her to the Persian Gulf tC
acquisition of a warm water port has long been the goal of Russian
ambitions. To free commercial access to the ports of Southern Persia her
claim is unassailable But more than this is needed to satisfy her ambitions
which aim at the obtaining of a fortified base upon the Indian Ocean connected
by a direct line of railway with European Russia, and defended bv a fWf
m the waters of the Middle East. Such a port would constitute an insupport
able menace to British interests, would involve the ruin of the hmv/ ^
position of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf, and won]/ necess/I the
r“ a on^s a of e in°dia a BrltlS “ ^ ' V ° Uld * ay burden /pon Jhe
More than half a century before there had been exchanged W™
Governments of Great Britain and Russia, and they had morethan once been