‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي". [ظ‎‎٥‎٢] (٣٨٦/١٠٩)

93 The question was then discussed whether, though it might be impossible
to conclude an agreement with Russia for the joint patronage and development
of Persia, yet it might be possible to arrange for a recognition of 13i tish and
Russian spheres of interest in the dominions of the Shah on lines analogous to
the agreement concluded between England and Russia as to spheres of mteres
iu relation to railways in China. Such an agreement might be equally extended
to mines, roads, and other industrial or economic undertakings, and wou d
to a certain degree extend to political influence also, even though not expressly
mentioned, as in eastern countries it is in the wake of railways and Cade that
political influence is most apt to follow. The line across lersia would have to
he drawn so as to include Kashan and Seistanin the British sphere, and it would
be manifestly difficult to arrive at an engagement that no political influence
should be exercised by either party on the opposite side of the line, since it
would be out of the question to remove the British representatives, either at
Tehran, Tabriz or Meshed, while corresponding objection would no doubt be felt
by the Russian Government. But even an engagement limited to railway and
commercial exploitation would have considerable value. The following.difficult
ties and drawbacks in the case of such an undeistanding weie then discussed.
The line proposed was not altogether assisted by geographical conditions, Seistan
being physically and administratively a part of the province of Khorasan, and
it was doubtful whether Russia would forego her designs upon Seistan and a port
on the eastern extremity of the Persian Gulf. A more serious drawback, how
ever, was the fact that the capital of Persia would lie in the Russian sphere, and the
pressure exercised by the Russian Government would become overwhelming, the
Shah would tend more and more to become a Russian puppet, and Northern Persia
a Russian proconsulate. The fate of such institutions as the Imperial Bank of
Persia and the Indo-European Telegraph Department would be more than
doubtful, the weight and influence of Russia throughout Central Asia would be
increased and the ultimate result might be the permanent break-up of the
Persian kingdom. Nor would this policy prevent Russia from approaching
the Persian Gulf via Baghdad, or other countries from attempting to acquire the
position in Southern Persia from which Russia had debarred herself. But,
while not sanguine of success, the Government of Lord Curzon expressed them
selves of opinion that the experiment was worthy of being made, in the interest
both of Persia itself, and still more of harmony between the two great Powers,
upon whose relations the peace of Asia depends. Such a contract, even if not
of perpetual duration, would he of immense value in the respite afforded from
the strain of an otherwise ceaseless rivalry and in the opportunity presented for
a peaceful consulidation of existing interests.
24. Should, however, the endeavour to arrive at an understanding with
Russia fail, then it would still he possible to fall back upon the alternative
policy recommended by Sir M. Durand which was that w r e should plainly
intimate that any Russian encroachments in Northern Persia w r ould provoke
corresponding measures for the protection of British interests in the south.
25. The despatch then turned to the increase of the Consular establishments
in Persia Lord Curzon recommended that Consular representatives should he
appointed at Kermanshah, Ahwaz and Bunder Abbas, that Kerman should be
made a permanent Consulate, that a Native Agent should be posted to Bampur
and fceistan and that a British officer should he sent to the latter place if the
rumoured nomination of a Russian Consul turned out true. The principle on
w hich the cost should be met by Great Britain or India was then discussed.
26. On examination of the cost of the various establishments maintained
by the British Government in Persia, it was shown that the Imperial Govern
ment. spent £15,460 and the Government of India £61,052 per annum, or, if
luikish Arabia w 7 ere included in the calculation, the totals amounted to,
Great Britain £15,597, India £71,056, contributions which did not at all fairly
represent the respective proportions of Imperial and of Indian interests in Persia
and its surroundings. Two principles might with advantage, in the opinion of
the Government of India, be borne iu mind in distributing such charges between
Great Britain and India, namely, (1) either the entire charges might be added
oget rer and divided in certain proportions between the Imperial and Indian
Exchequers, or {2) the spheres in Persia of special concern either to Her Majesty’s