‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي". [و‎‎٥‎٨] (٣٨٦/١٢٠)

islands of Kishm, Henjam, and Hormuz ; (3) the exclusion of any foreign
Power from the isthmus of Maklab to Musandim Point and along the El
Batineh coast between Khor Kalba and Dibba, as far as circumstances would
admit ; and (4) the protection of British subjects and trades at Bushire so long
as no serious operations on land were required at that port. The visits of
British ships to other islands and ports in the Gulf would otherwise suffice to
maintain our influence there.
2. The second question propounded was —“ What action would it be
expedient that Great Britain should take in the event of disorders occurring in
Persia, and occasioning a Russian occupation in the north—or in anticipation
of such disorder—it being understood that occupation by Great Britain of
Persian territory would not be directed against Russia, but would be under
taken in the interests of peace and order, and as an assertion of the position of
Great Britain as jointly interested with Russia in the maintenance of the
Persian Kingdom.
The extent of action open to us was held to he limited by the following
conditions
(i) We have no troops available for the effective occupation of Persian
territory, or even of any large number of Persian ports ; and it is by troops,
and not by ships, that positions on the sea-coast must be held.
(ii) We should run the risk of creating a most unfavourable impression
upon India if we occupied any ports or districts from which we might probably
he forced to retire, either iu view of an impending collusion with Russia, or
subsequently to an outbreak of hostilities.
(iii) Whatever steps we might take should be such as to involve as little
as possible the risk of further complications by the intervention of other
foreign Powers iu any temporary measures taken to preserve order in X^ersia.
Tire conclusion arrived at was that, in the contingency above mentioned
of a Russian occupation in the north, we should at once occupy Bunder Abbas,
and the three islands of Hormuz, Kishm, and Henjam ; that we should protect
and watch British interests at Bushire ; that we should occupy, or be prepared
to occupy, Seistan, with an adequate force of troops from India ; and that our
ships of war should pay visits to other ports and islands in the Gulf. But it
was held that no other occupation of territory or operations inland should be
attempted.
3. The third question was —“ In what particular portions of Persia and
by what methods can the extension of British influence be most successfully
prosecuted and to the best advantage for general purposes, and for the contin
gencies mentioned in questions (1) and (2).”
The answer to this question was determined by what had been settled on
the preceding questions. We should, it was thought, steadily prepare for an
occupation of Scistan by extending the railway beyond Nushki and pushing
our trade. We should reassert our claims at Bassidore and in the Musandim
Promontory, especially in the Elphinstone Inlet, and revert to the jurisdiction
of the Chief of Shargah over the coast from Dibba to Khor Khalba. All
possible care should be taken to prevent any other Power from gaining a foot
ing at Bunder Abbas or on any one of the neighbouring islands. Eor the rest,
we should continue to encourage trade on the Karun, to maintain our position
at Bushire, and to support Persia as long as possible by peaceful means. The
extension of telegraphs under British management was also indicated as a
desirable measure.
As regards railways, Sir W. Nicholson stated that a railway from Bunder
Abbas or Charbar to Ispahan would be to our advantage if we had troops
available to guard it in time of war. But as we had not, the opening up of
these routes would merely provide the Russians w r ith increased facilities for
getting to the Southern Coast.
Prince Louis of Battenberg explained that the establishment of a Russian
coal depot at Charbar might he a convenience for their cruisers and transports