‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي". [و‎‎١‎٧‎٧] (٣٨٦/٣٥٨)

95
V* regards tue Question of our future relations witli I3alirein, you submit
certain proposals by Captain Prideaux, which may be summarised as follows
(a) That it _ would be better that, until the Political Agent has
acquired adequate influence ever the Sheikh, no steps whatever
should be taken to press on Sheikh Esa the proposals recemmended.
originally in your letter No. 123 (Confidential) of 11th March last
and referred to in this Department letter No. 1873-E.B. of
17th May.
(b) That the Political Agent should be authorised to intervene with
direct instructions to the Chief in the following matters,
namely,—
(£) the oppression exercised by the A1 Khalifa family, the Magis
terial and Revenue officials, and the Kazis;
(ii) the extravagant entertainment of Bedouins ;
(Hi) reform of land revenue administration;
(iv) legal disputes between the Sheikh and his subjects.
Captain Prideaux appears to hope that, by consistently adopting this
policy, the Political Agent will gradually be furnished with a status in the
island independent of the Sheikh ; that the Sheikh will thus be cowed into
an attitude of gener d amenability to reasonable suggestions ; and that the
termination of the present system of exactions will result in so much loss of
revenue to the Sheikh that he will, in his own interest, desire the reform of his
Customs.
4. You concur in the advisability of adopting Captain Prideaux’s first sug
gestion ; but before submitting any definite opinion on his other proposals, you
invite a pronouncement of the Government of India on the proposition that
there is no middle course between the two policies of treating Bahrein (1) as a
full British Protectorate ; (2) as an independent principality.
It is clear to the Government of India that such a middle course does
exist ; but before replying to your enquiry, I am to point out, with reference
to your interpretation of a full British Protectorate as involving the right
to intervene in the internal administration of Bahrein to the extent contem
plated by Captain Prideaux, that there is no authority for the supposition
that Great Britain would necessarily possess such a right, even were she
formally to notify a British Protectorate over Bahrein to foreign Powers.
This misconception is due to the assumption which has been made that the
alternative to regarding the Sheikh of Bahrein as an independent Sovereign
is to treat him like a petty Indian Raja. The analogy here introduced,
although not without its uses as indicating the methods which in the light
of Indian experience, may successfully be employed in dealing with the
Chief, must be regarded as misleading in several important respects. Por,
even assuming that the measure cf interference advocated by the Political
Agent would be legitimate in an Indian Native State (a. proposition which
needs some reservations in the instance of such Chiefs as enjoy a full measure
of internal autonomy), it must be borne in mind that in the case of Native
States in India, the British Power is the Sovereign, and not merely the Pro
tecting Power, and that in the same degree as they have lost the majority of
the attributes of sovereignty as well as of independence, reciprocal rights
and obligations have been created between them and the Government of India
which as yet have no exact counterpart in the relations of Great Britain to
Bahrein.
The exact interpretation of a Protectorate is a general question of interna
tional law into which the Government of India see no necessity to enter on the
present occasion. But, as regards the case of Bahrein, the facts appear to them
to be sufficient to establish the following conclusions. They are of opinion that
Great Britain is the Protecting Power of Bahrein, and that Bahrein is, therefore,